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Abstract. We propose a generalization of first-order logic originating in a neglected work
by C.C. Chang: a natural and generic correspondence language for any types of structures
which can be recast as Set-coalgebras. We discuss axiomatization and completeness results
for several natural classes of such logics. Moreover, we show that an entirely general
completeness result is not possible. We study the expressive power of our language, both in
comparison with coalgebraic hybrid logics and with existing first-order proposals for special
classes of Set-coalgebras (apart from relational structures, also neighbourhood frames
and topological spaces). Basic model-theoretic constructions and results, in particular
ultraproducts, obtain for the two classes that allow completeness—and in some cases
beyond that. Finally, we discuss a basic sequent system, for which we establish a syntactic
cut-elimination result.
Dedicated to Jirˇ´ı Ada´mek on the occasion of his seventieth birthday
1. Introduction
Modal logics are traditionally a core formalism in computer science. Classically, their seman-
tics is relational, i.e. a model typically comes with a set of states and one or several binary
accessibility relations on the state set. However, non-relational semantics of various descrip-
tions have come to play an increasing role, e.g. in concurrency, reasoning about knowledge
and agency, description logics and ontologies. Models may involve such diverse features as
concurrent games, as in coalition logic and alternating-time temporal logic [AHK02, Pau02];
probabilities [LS91, FH94, HM01]; integer weights as in the multigraph semantics of graded
modal logic [DV02]; neighbourhoods [Che80]; and selection functions or preference orderings
as in the different variants of conditional logic [Lew73, Che80]. Coalgebraic modal logic
serves as a unifying framework for such non-relational modal logics [CKP+11].
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Relational modal logic can be seen as a subset of first-order logic, specifically as the
bisimulation-invariant fragment as shown by van Benthem for arbitrary models and later
shown for finite models by Rosen [vB76, Ros97]. An analogous first-order counterpart for
coalgebraic modal logic has been introduced in previous work by two of the authors [SP10a].
The language described there does support a van Benthem/Rosen-style theorem. It is quite
expressive but has a fairly complex syntax with three sorts, modelling states, sets of states,
and composite states, respectively, and is equipped with a carefully tuned Henkin-style
semantics. In the current work we develop coalgebraic predicate logic (CPL), a first-order
correspondence language for coalgebraic predicate logic that is slightly less expressive than
the language proposed originally but has a simpler syntax and a straightforward semantics
that does not require any design decisions. The naturality of CPL is further corroborated
by the fact that CPL is expressively equivalent to hybrid logic (see the overview article
by Areces and ten Cate [AtC07]) with satisfaction operators and universal quantification
(equivalently with the downarrow binder ↓ and a global modality). Thus, CPL not only
serves as a correspondence language for coalgebraic modal logic but also arises by adding
a standard set of desirable expressive features widely used in specification and knowledge
representation.
Our proposal originates in a largely forgotten paper by C.C. Chang [Cha73] who
introduces a first-order logic of Scott-Montague neighbourhood frames, which in coalgebraic
terms can be seen as coalgebras for the doubly contravariant powerset functor. Chang’s
original motivation was to simplify model theory for what Montague called pragmatics and to
replace Montague’s many-sorted setting by a single-sorted one. Chang’s contributions were
primarily of a model-theoretic nature. He provided adaptations of the notions of (elementary)
submodel/extension, elementary chain of models and ultraproduct and established a Tarski-
Vaught theorem as well as downward and upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems. Our syntax
is a notational variant of Chang’s syntax; semantically, we generalize from neighbourhood
frames to coalgebras for an underlying set functor, thus capturing the full range of non-
relational modalities indicated above.
Our semantics naturally extends coalgebraic modal logic in that it is parametrized
over an interpretation of the modal operators as predicate liftings [Pat03, Sch08]. It can
thus be instantiated with modalities such as, for instance, the standard relational ♦; with
neighbourhood-based modalities as in Chang’s original setup; with probabilistic operators
Lp ‘with probability at least p’; or with a binary conditional ⇒ ‘if – then normally’. We
incorporate a unary ♥ into a first-order language by allowing formulas of the form
t♥dz : φe
where t is a term, φ is a formula of coalgebraic predicate logic, z is a (comprehension)
variable. Such a formula stipulates that t satisfies ♥, applied to the set of all z that satisfy φ.
For example, in standard modal logic over relational semantics, the formula x♦dz : z = ye
says that x has y as a (relational) successor. In the probabilistic setting, the formula
xLpdy : y 6= xe states that the probability of moving from x to a different state is at least p.
As indicated above, CPL supports a van Benthem / Rosen type result stating essentially
that coalgebraic modal logic is the bisimulation-invariant fragment of CPL both over the class
of all structures and over the class of finite structures; this result is proved in a companion
paper [SPL17], which also establishes a Gaifman-type theorem for CPL. In the current paper,
we establish the following results on CPL:
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• We give a Hilbert-style axiomatization that we prove strongly complete for two particular
classes of coalgebraic structures, viz. structures that are either neighbourhood-like or
bounded, where the latter type includes the relational and the graded case as well as
positive Presburger modalities. As usual in model theory, strong completeness can be
supplemented with a suitable variant of the Omitting Types Theorem.
• While boundedness is a rather strong condition on structures, we show that the condition is
fairly essential for completeness in the sense that within a much broader type of ω-bounded
structures, the bounded structures are the only ones that allow for strong completeness.
• As indicated above, we establish the equivalence of CPL and several natural variants of
coalgebraic hybrid logic.
• We prove some basic model-theoretic results. Specifically, we show that, under the
same (alternative) assumptions as for our completeness result, ultraproducts exist and
a downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem holds; in fact, it turns our that the latter is
applicable more broadly, requiring as it does only ω-boundedness in place of boundedness
in its corresponding variant.
• We give sequent systems complementing the above-mentioned Hilbert system, and establish
completeness, under the same (alternative) assumptions as for the Hilbert system, and
more interestingly, syntactic cut-elimination for the “neighbourhood-like” case.
The material is organized as follows. In §2 we introduce the syntax and semantics of CPL
and give a number of intuitive examples. In § 3 we discuss the Hilbert-style axiomatization
and associated completeness results. We proceed to clarify the relationship between CPL
and several variants of coalgebraic modal and hybrid logic in § 4. In § 5 we take first steps
in the model theory of CPL, and § 6 deals with proof theory. While our presentation of the
basic definitions in coalgebraic logic is self-contained in principle, we do import some of its
basic results. Additional information is found in work on coalgebraic finite models [Sch07],
one-step rules [SP09, SP10c], and modularization of coalgebraic logics [SP11].
1.1. Related Work. As already discussed, the syntax of our logic follows Chang’s first-
order logic of neighbourhood frames [Cha73]. An alternative, two-sorted language for
neighbourhood frames has been proposed by Hansen et al. [HKP09]. Over neighbourhood
frames, the language studied in the present work is a fragment of the two-sorted one; we
give details in § 2.
First-order formalisms have also been considered for topological spaces, which are
particular instances of neighbourhood frames when defined in terms of local neighbourhood
bases. In particular, Sgro [Sgr80] studies interior operator logic in topology with interior
modalities for finite topological powers of the space. This language is the weakest one in
the hierarchy of topological languages considered in an early overview by Ziegler [Zie85].
Makowsky and Marcja [MM77] prove a range of completeness theorems for topological logics,
including a completeness result for the Chang language itself, i.e., a special version of our
Theorem 3.19. See also ten Cate et al. [CGS09] for a more contemporary reference. Despite
the fact that CPL combines quantifiers and modalities, it should not be confused with what
is usually termed quantified or first-order modal logic; see Remark 2.1.
As mentioned above, our logic is less expressive but more naturally defined than the
correspondence language used in the first van Benthen/Rosen type characterization result
for coalgebraic modal logic [SP10a]. Axiomatizations and model-theoretic results as we
develop here are not currently available for the more expressive language of [SP10a].
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A different generic first-order logic largely concerned with the Kleisli category of a
monad rather than with coalgebras for a functor is introduced and studied in [Jac10]. Of all
the languages discussed above, this one seems least related to the present one; indeed, the
study of connections with languages like that of the original, three-sorted variant [SP10a] is
mentioned by Jacobs [Jac10] as a subject for future research.
This paper is based on results first announced in earlier conference papers [LPSS12,
LPS13]. Compared to the conference versions, it features full proofs and additional examples.
Some results previously only mentioned such as the Omitting Types Theorem (Theorem
3.30) are explicitly stated and proved here for the first time. We also corrected a number
of errors and typos. Most notably, as reconstructing the proof of cut-elimination for the
G3c-style system proposed in [LPS13] proved problematic, we replaced it with a G1c-style
system in this version, with a different treatment of equality and provided all the proof
details.
2. Syntax, Semantics and Examples
We proceed to give a formal definition of coalgebraic predicate logic (CPL). We fix a set Σ
of predicate symbols and a modal similarity type Λ, i.e. a set of modal operators. Modal
operators ♥ ∈ Λ and predicate symbols P ∈ Σ both come with fixed arities ar♥, arP ∈ N.
The set CPL(Λ,Σ) of CPL formulas over Λ and Σ is given by the grammar
CPL(Λ,Σ) 3 φ, ψ ::= y1 = y2 | P (~x) | ⊥ | φ→ ψ | ∀x.φ | x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne
where ♥ ∈ Λ is an n-ary modal operator and P ∈ Σ a k-ary predicate symbol, x, yi are
variables from a fixed set iVar we keep implicit. We just write CPL(Λ) for CPL(Λ, ∅) and
sometimes we omit Λ and Σ altogether. Booleans and the existential quantifier are defined
in the standard way. We do not include function symbols, which can be added in a standard
way [Cha73]. We adopt the usual convention that the scope of a quantifier extends as far to
the right as possible. In the dyi : φie component, yi is used as a comprehension variable,
i.e., dyi : φie denotes a subset of the carrier of the model, to which modal operators can
be applied in the usual way. In x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne, x is free and yi is bound in φi,
otherwise the notions of freeness and boundedness are standard. We write FV(φ) for the
set of free variables of a formula φ. A variable is fresh for a formula if it does not have free
occurrences in it; to save space, we will also sometimes say that x ∈ iVar is fresh for y ∈ iVar
whenever it is distinct from it. A sentence, as usual, is a formula without free variables.
As usual, some care is needed when defining substitution to avoid, on the one hand,
capture of newly substituted variables by quantifiers and on the other hand, substituting for
a bound variable. We take as our model the discussion in Enderton’s monograph [End01,
p. 112–113]. As we now have two ways in which a variable can become bound and the
binder ♥ involves also a variable/term in a non-binding way, it is desirable to spell out
details. We thus define—prima facie not necessarily capture-avoiding—substitution α[t/x]
with t, x ∈ iVar (had we allowed for function symbols, t could be any term) as replacing x
with t in atomic formulas and commuting with implication (and of course other Boolean
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connectives, were they taken as primitives). For binders, the clauses are:
(∀x.φ)[t/y] =
{
∀x.φ x = y
∀x.φ[t/y] otherwise,
(x♥dz1 : φ1e . . . dzn : φne)[t/y] = u♥dz1 : φ′1e . . . dzn : φ′ne
where φ′i =
{
φi y = zi
φ′i[t/y] otherwise,
and u =
{
t x = y
x otherwise.
This of course cannot work without restrictions, so we follow Enderton in defining the notion
of substitutability of t for x in a term. There are no restrictions on substitutability in atomic
formulas, and for implications, it is defined as substitutability in the two argument formulas.
Finally, t is substitutable for x in z♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne whenever for every i, t is either
• fresh for dyi : φie (this includes the case t = yi) or
• different from yi and substitutable for x in φi.
Note that in the first alternative, substituting t for x has no effect on dyi : φie. In a language
with more general terms, the second alternative would require that yi is fresh for t rather than
different from t. Substitutability of t for x in ∀y1.φ1 is defined similarly (and standardly).
We depart from Enderton’s conventions by restricting, from now on, the usage of the
α[t/x] notation to the case where t is substitutable for x in α (as usual, when this is not the
case the substitution can still be applied after suitably renaming bound variables in α). For
example, the axiom scheme ∀~y.(∀x.φ→ φ[z/x]) denoted as En2 in Table 1 has as its valid
instances only those formulas where z is substitutable for x.
The semantics of CPL is parametrized over the choice of an endofunctor T on Set
that determines the underlying system type: models are based on T -coalgebras, i.e. pairs
(C, γ : C → TC) consisting of a carrier set C of worlds or states and a transition function γ.
We think of the elements of TC as being composite states; e.g. if T is the identity functor
then a composite state is just a state, and if T is powerset, then a composite state is a set
of states. Thus, the transition function assigns to each state c a composite state γ(c) that
represents the successors of c and that we correspondingly refer to as the composite successor
of c. E.g. in case T is powerset, a T -coalgebra assigns to each state a set of successor states,
and hence is essentially a Kripke frame.
To interpret the modal operators, we extend T to a Λ-structure, i.e. we associate to
every n-ary modal operator ♥ ∈ Λ a set-indexed family of mappingsJ♥KC : (QC)n → QTC
where Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor, subject to naturality, i.e.
(Tf)−1 ◦ J♥KC = J♥KD ◦ (f−1)n
for every set-theoretic function f : C → D. In categorical parlance, this means that J♥K is a
natural transformation Qn → Q ◦ T op; we recall that the contravariant powerset functor Q
maps a set X to the powerset of X and a map X → Y to the preimage map Qf : QY → QX,
i.e. Qf(A) = f−1[A] for A ⊆ Y . Each such J♥K is called a predicate lifting [Pat03, Sch08].
Formally speaking, we should define a Λ-structure as a pair (T, (J♥K)♥∈Λ), but to avoid
cumbersome notation and terminology, we will speak about a Λ-structure based on T (or a
Λ-structure over T ) and suppress the second component of the pair whenever (J♥K)♥∈Λ is
clear from the context.
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A triple M = (C, γ, I) consisting of a coalgebra γ : C → TC and a predicate interpreta-
tion I : Σ → ⋃
n∈ω
Q(Cn) respecting arities of symbols will be called a (coalgebraic) model.
In other words, a coalgebraic model consists simply of a Set-coalgebra and an ordinary
first-order model whose universe coincides with the carrier of the coalgebra. Given a model
M = (C, γ, I) and a valuation v : iVar→ C, we define satisfaction M, v |= φ in the standard
way for first-order connectives and for ♥ by the clause
M, v |= x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne ⇐⇒ γ(v(x)) ∈ J♥KC(Jφ1Ky1M, . . . , JφnKynM )
where JφKyM = {c ∈ C |M, v[c/y] |= φ} (2.1)
and v[c/y] is v modified by mapping y to c.
Remark 2.1. Quantified or first-order modal logic in the sense used widely in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., [Gar01]) combines quantification and modalities in a two-sorted and,
effectively, two-dimensional semantics: One has an underlying set of worlds as well as an
underlying set of individuals, with modalities interpreted as moving between worlds and
quantification interpreted as ranging over individuals in the current world. We emphasize
that although CPL also combines modalities and quantifiers, it is not a quantified modal
logic in this sense: it is interpreted over a single set of individuals, and both the modalities
and the quantifiers move within this set. In particular, the instance of CPL induced by the
standard modalities equipped with their usual predicate liftings is standard first-order logic
rather than a quantified modal logic, as we discuss below in some detail.
In a companion paper on the van Benthem-Rosen theorem for CPL [SPL17] and in conference
papers the present work is based upon [LPSS12, LPS13], we have focused on Chang’s original
motivation for this language [Cha73]. Namely, Chang saw his setup as a modification
of Montague’s account of pragmatics, tailored to reasoning about social situations and
relationships between an individual and sets of individuals. We have proposed a series
of examples kept in the same spirit, utilizing Facebook, Twitter and social networks. In
the present paper, we offer examples based on, so to say, networking of a more low-level
character, especially delay- or disruption-tolerant networking (DTN ). We do not claim to be
very accurate with respect to specifications of concrete protocols; our examples are of purely
inspirational and illustrative character. It is worth mentioning, though, that such routing
and forwarding protocols can be backed by social insights [HCY08], so in a sense we are still
following the spirit of our original examples.1
Neighbourhood Frames. Scott/Montague neighbourhood semantics is captured coalge-
braically using Λ = {} and putting TC = QQC (the doubly contravariant powerset
functor), which extends to a Λ-structure byJKC(A) = {σ ∈ TC | A ∈ σ}.
A T -coalgebra then associates to each state a set of sets of states, i.e. a system of neighbour-
hoods; thus, T -coalgebras are just neighbourhood frames. In the presence of a binary relation
S(x, y) that we read as ‘node/router y is in the forwarding table of x’ and interpreting  as
‘is a recognized subcommunity’, the formula
∃y.xdz : S(z, y)e
1In particular, Hui et al. [HCY08] gave us the idea of using subcommunities in this context.
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reads as ‘there exists a certain y such that amongst the subcommunities recognized by x,
there is one formed exactly by those having y in its forwarding table’.
The instance of CPL that we obtain in this way is, up to quite minor syntactic differences,
Chang’s original language [Cha73]. As mentioned in § 1, it embeds as a fragment into Hansen
et al.’s two-sorted correspondence language [HKP09]. We refrain from giving full syntactic
details; roughly, the setup is as follows. The two-sorted language has sorts s for states and n
for neighbourhoods, and features binary infix predicates N and E respectively modelling the
neighbourhood relation between states and neighbourhoods, and the inverse elementhood
relation 3 between neighbourhoods and states. Then our x♥dy : φ(y)e can be translated as
∃u.(xNu ∧ ∀y.(uEy ↔ φ(y))).
Relational first-order logic. Instantiating CPL with the usual modalities of relational
modal logic, specifically the logic K, we obtain a notational variant of ordinary FOL over
relational structures, that is, of the usual correspondence language. The main idea has
already been indicated in the introduction: we encode the successor relation in formulas
of the form x♦dz : y = ze, which states that y is a successor of x. Formally, we capture
the standard modality and the propositional atoms of the relational modal logic K in the
similarity type
Λ = {♦} ∪ At
where At is a set of propositional atoms; as expected, ♦ is unary, and a ∈ At is nullary. We
interpret these operators over the functor T given on objects by
TX = PX × PAt
where P denotes the covariant powerset functor. That is, a coalgebra γ : C → TC assigns
to each state c ∈ C a set of successors as well as a set of propositional atoms valid in c. The
interpretation is defined by means of predicate liftings
[[♦]]X(A) = {(Y,U) ∈ PX × PAt | A ∩ Y 6= ∅}
[[a]]X = {(Y,U) ∈ PX × PAt | a ∈ U}
where, corresponding to the arity of the modal operators, the predicate lifting for ♦ is
unary and the predicate liftings for the a ∈ At are nullary. These predicate liftings capture
precisely the standard semantics of both ♦ and the propositional atoms. In particular, the
above-mentioned formula x♦dz : y = ze really does say that y is a successor of x. (Notice
that in the nullary case, our syntax instantiates to formulas x a saying that x satisfies the
propositional atom a).
The standard first-order correspondence language of modal logic has unary predicates
a for the atoms a ∈ At and a binary predicate R to represent the successor relation. We
translate CPL(Λ) as defined above into the standard correspondence language by just
extending the standard translation of modal logic to CPL, with the modification that the
current state is represented by an explicit variable in CPL so that it is no longer necessary to
index the standard translation with a variable name. That is, our translation ST is defined
in the modal cases (which by our conventions include the case of propositional atoms) by
ST (x♦dy : φe) = ∃y.R(x, y) ∧ ST (φ)
ST (x a) = a(x) (a ∈ At)
and by commutation with all other constructs. In the converse direction, we translate R(x, y)
into x♦dz : z = ye and a(x) into x a. In summary, CPL over Λ = {♦} ∪ At with the above
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semantics is expressively equivalent to the standard first-order correspondence language of
modal logic.
Graded Modal Logic. We obtain a variant of graded modal logic [Fin72] if we consider
the similarity type Λ = {〈k〉 | k ≥ 0} where 〈k〉 reads as ‘more than k successors satisfy
. . . ’. We interpret the ensuing logic over multigraphs [DV02], which are coalgebras for the
multiset functor B given on objects by
BX = {µ : X → N ∪ {∞} | f a map}.
We see such a map µ : X → N ∪ {∞} as an integer-valued discrete measure on X, i.e.
we write µ(A) =
∑
x∈A µ(x) for A ⊆ X. Then, B acts on maps f : X → Y by taking
image measures; i.e. Bf(µ)(B) = µ(f−1[B]) for B ⊆ Y . We extend B to a Λ-structure by
stipulating J〈k〉KX(A) = {µ ∈ BX | µ(A) > k}
to express that more than k successors (counted with multiplicities) have property A. Note
that over Kripke frame, graded operators can be coded into standard first order logic; the
difference with standard first-order logic arises through the multigraph semantics, for which
the requisite expressive means arise only through the graded operators.
Continuing our line of routing examples, we can, given a B-coalgebra γ : C → BC, think
of γ(c)(c′) as the number of packets forwarded from c to c′ in the past hour. In the presence
of a binary relation S(x, y) interpreted as above, the formula
¬∃y.(x〈k〉dz : S(y, z)e)
then expresses that there is no router y s.t. the total number of packets sent by x to nodes
in y’s forwarding table in the past hour exceeds k.
Presburger modal logic and arithmetic. A more general set of operators than graded
modal logic is that of positive Presburger modal logic [DL06], which admits integer linear
inequalities
∑n
i=1 ai ·#(φi) > k among formulas where ai ≥ 0 for all i. We see such a formula
as an application of an n-ary modality Lk(a1, . . . , an) to formulas φ1, . . . , φn, and interpret
this modality over the multiset functor B as introduced above by the n-ary predicate lifting
[[Lk(a1, . . . , an)]]X(A1, . . . , An) = {µ ∈ BX |
∑n
i=1 ai · µ(Ai) > k}.
In addition to the binary predicate S, let us also introduce unary predicate O(x) expressing
that x is an overloaded node. The formula
∀x.((xL10,000(1, 3)dy : S(x, y)edy : O(y)e)→ O(x))
means that, if the weighted number of packets sent by x to overloaded nodes combined
with packets x sends to all nodes in its forwarding table exceeds 10,000, then x itself is
overloaded.
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Combination of Frame Classes. Frame classes can be combined: we can take T = B×QQ
and combine operators for packet counting and subcommunity recognition. A formula
¬xdy : y〈30〉du : u 6= zee
expresses then that the collection of those nodes which have forwarded more than 30 packages
to servers different than z in the past hour is not a subcommunity recognized by x.
Probabilistic Modal Logic. The discrete distribution functor D is defined on objects by
DX = {µ : X → [0, 1] |∑x µ(x) = 1},
and on morphisms by taking image measures exactly as for the multiset functor B discussed
earlier. Coalgebras for D thus associate to every state a probability distribution over
successor states; such structures are known as Markov chains, or probabilistic transition
systems, or type spaces. Taking the similarity type Λ = {〈p〉 | p ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q}, with 〈p〉 read
as ‘with probability more than p’ (thus departing from the choice of operators Lp ‘ with
probability at least p’ that we used in the introduction), we formally interpret 〈p〉 using the
predicate lifting J〈p〉KX(A) = {µ ∈ DX | µ(A) > p}
over D. We thus obtain a form of probabilistic first-order logic for probabilistic transition
systems that extends probabilistic modal logic [LS91, FH94, HM01]. Continuing our line of
routing examples, if we interpret the transition probabilities as the likelihood of a server
forwarding any given packet to another, then the formula
∀x, y.(x〈1/2〉dz : z = ye → y〈1/2〉dz : z = xe)
expresses a partial form of symmetric connectivity: whenever a server x prefers the connection
to y in the sense that it will more likely than not route any given packet through y, then
the same will hold in the other direction.
We obtain a version of this logic with finitely many modal operators in situations where
all possible probabilities are contained in some finite set of rationals (such as when rolling a
fair die). We then consider substructures of the form
DkX = {µ ∈ D(X) | µ(x) ∈ {i/k | i = 0, . . . , k}},
restricting the modal operators to come from Λk = {〈n/k〉 | n = 0, . . . , k}.
Non-Monotonic Conditionals. An example of a binary modality is provided by (condi-
tional) implication >. Such operators are interpreted over a variety of semantic structures;
one of these involves selection function frames, which in our terminology can be defined as
coalgebras for the selection function functor S. The latter acts on objects by
SX = {f : QX → PX}
and, correspondingly, on maps f : X → Y by Sf = Qf → Pf : SX → SY , i.e. Sf(g)(A) =
f [g(f−1[A])] for A ⊆ X (recall that Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor). We
think of fx ∈ SX as selecting the set fx(A) of worlds which x sees as ‘most typical’ given a
condition A ⊆ X. Over this functor, we interpret the conditional > by the predicate liftingJ>KX(A,B) = {f ∈ SX | f(A) ∩B 6= ∅}.
The formula φ > ψ expresses that ψ is typically possible under condition φ. This presentation
of conditional logic is dual to the standard presentation [Che80] in terms of a binary
10 TADEUSZ LITAK, DIRK PATTINSON, KATSUHIKO SANO, AND LUTZ SCHRO¨DER
operator ⇒ ‘if – then normally’, related to > by a > b ≡ ¬(a⇒ ¬b). For our purposes, >
has the technical advantage of being bounded in the second argument in a sense that we
will introduce in § 3.
We continue to interpret our examples in the context of routing: Given an S-coalgebra
(i.e. selection function frame) γ : C → SC, we may read γ(c)(A) as the set of those servers
through which server c will normally route an incoming packet if c is currently active in the
subcommunity A ⊆ C. Then a formula of the form
∀x, u.(φ(u)→ x > dy : φ(y)edz : z = ue)
says that if x is currently active in a subcommunity delineated by the formula φ(y) and u
belongs to that subcommunity, then u is normally a possible target for packets forwarded
by x.
We have not mentioned propositional atoms other than in the example on relational
first-order logic. We introduce an explicit notion of propositional atom as part of a modal
signature:
Definition 2.2. A nullary modality p ∈ Λ is a propositional atom if T decomposes as
T = T ′ × 2 and under this decomposition, [[p]]X = T ′X × {>}.
Remark 2.3. Propositional atoms can easily be added to all our examples by just extending
the functor with a component for their interpretation, as indicated in the above definition.
Explicitly, if At is a set of propositional atoms and T ′ is a functor, then the atoms p ∈ At
give rise to nullary modalities p, interpreted over T = T ′ × P(At) by [[p]]X = {(t, U) ∈
T ′X × P(At) | p ∈ U}. In fact, this is an instance of what we have called combination of
frame classes above: Systems featuring only propositional atoms with pointwise valuations,
and no further transition structure, are captured as coalgebras for the constant functor
P(At), and this system type can be freely combined with others. A coalgebraic framework
for such combinations of system types and modalities is afforded by multisorted coalgebra,
essentially following the principle of converting components of the coalgebraic type functor
into sorts [SP11]. General results in this framework imply that completeness properties
transfer smoothly to such logic combinations (essentially, to fusions in standard terminology).
In particular, completeness will always extend without further ado under adding propositional
atoms to a logic, so we will continue to largely elide them in the discussion of examples.
3. Completeness
In § 3.2 below, we propose an axiom system for CPL, sound wrt arbitrary structures
(Theorem 3.17) and in § 3.3 we show its completeness wrt structures s.t. each operator
on every coordinate is either “neighbourhood-like” or “Kripke-like” (Theorem 3.19). As
discussed in § 3.5, even a mild relaxation of these conditions makes a generic completeness
result impossible.
However, not only for the proof, but even for the statements of our completeness result,
or of the axiomatization itself, we need some spadework.
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3.1. S1SC and Boundedness. In order to state our axiomatization and completeness
results, we need several notions from coalgebraic model theory. The first of them, central to
the entire edifice, is that of one-step satisfiability.
Definition 3.1 (One-step logic).
• Given a supply of primitive symbols D (which can be any set), define the set Prop(D) of
Boolean D-formulas (or propositions) as
A,B ::= d | A→ B | ⊥
where d ∈ D, and the set Λ(D) of modalized D-formulas as
Λ(D) = {♥d1 . . . dn | d1, . . . , dn ∈ D and ♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary}.
Then the set Rank1(D) of rank-1 D-formulas is defined as
Rank1(D) = Prop(Λ(Prop(D)));
in other words, a rank-1 formula is a Boolean combination of formulas consisting of a
modality from Λ applied to Boolean combinations of atoms from D.
• Given a set C and a valuation τ : D → P(C), we extend τ to Prop(D) using the Boolean
algebra structure of P(C), and then write C, τ |= A if τ(A) = C, for A ∈ Prop(D).
• Given the same data, we define the extension [[φ]]TC,τ ⊆ TC of φ ∈ Rank1(D) by extending
the assignment J♥A1 . . .AnKTX,τ = J♥KC(τ(A1), . . . , τ(An))
using the Boolean algebra structure of P(TC).
• We then write TC, τ |= φ if JφKTC,τ = TC, and t |=TC,τ φ if t ∈ JφKTC,τ .
• If D ⊆ P(C) and τ is just the inclusion, we will usually drop it from the notation; in
particular, for subsets Y1, . . . , Yn ⊆ C and ♥ ∈ Λ n-ary, we write t |= ♥(Y1, . . . , Yn) to
mean t ∈ [[♥]]C(Y1, . . . , Yn).
• A set Ξ ⊆ Rank1 is one-step satisfiable w.r.t. τ if ⋂φ∈ΞJφKTC,τ 6= ∅.
Just like in the case of coalgebraic modal logic (see § 4 below), proof systems for CPL are
best described in terms of rank-1 rules – or, more precisely, rule schemes –, which describe
the geometry of the Λ-structure under consideration [Sch07].
Definition 3.2 (One-Step Rules). Fix a collection sVar of schematic variables p, q, r . . .
• A one-step rule is of the form A/P where A ∈ Prop(sVar) and P ∈ Rank1(sVar) is a
disjunctive clause over Λ(sVar), i.e. a finite disjunction of formulas that are either in
Λ(sVar) or negations of formulas in Λ(sVar). As usual, we impose moreover that every
schematic variable is mentioned at most once in P , and every schematic variable occurring
in A occurs also in P .
• A rule A/P is one-step sound if
TC, τ |= P whenever C, τ |= A for a valuation τ : sVar→ P(C).
• Given a set R of one-step rules and a valuation τ : sVar→ P(C), a set Ξ ⊆ Rank1(sVar)
is one-step consistent (with respect to τ) [SP10c] if the set
Ξ ∪ {Pσ | σ : sVar→ Prop(sVar) and A/P is a rule in R s.t. C, τ |= Aσ}
is propositionally consistent, where A 7→ Aσ and P 7→ Pσ denote the obvious inductive
extensions of σ to Prop(sVar) and Rank1(sVar), respectively (in other words, we see σ as a
substitution, and use postfix notation to denote application of substitutions).
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Assumption 3.3. For purposes of the technical development (excluding the examples), we
fix from now on a set R of one-step sound one-step rules.
We next introduce the two variants of one-step completeness that we need for our global
completeness proof. By one-step, we mean that the completeness assumption is only made for
a very simple logic that precludes nesting of modal operators, and hence can be interpreted
over single elements of TC rather than full coalgebraic models.
Definition 3.4 (Strong One-Step Completeness [SP10c]). The rule set R is strongly one-step
complete (S1SC, neighbourhood-like) for a Λ-structure if
for every C ∈ Set, Ξ ⊆ Rank1(sVar), and τ : sVar→ P(C),
Ξ is one-step satisfiable wrt τ whenever Ξ is one-step consistent wrt τ .
Similarly, R is finitary S1SC if the same condition holds for τ restricted to be of type
sVar→ Pfin(C).
By the usual argument, both forms of strong one-step completeness imply corresponding
forms of compactness:
Definition 3.5 (One-step compactness). Λ-structure is one-step compact if for every set X,
every finitely satisfiable set Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(PX)) of one-step formulas is satisfiable. Similarly,
a Λ-structure is finitary one-step compact if for every set X, every finitely satisfiable set
Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(PfinX)) of one-step formulas is satisfiable.
Lemma 3.6. Every (finitary) S1SC Λ-structure is (finitary) one-step compact.
Remark 3.7. Every (finitary) S1SC rule set derives the congruence rule
p1 ↔ q1 . . . par♥ ↔ qar♥
♥(p1, . . . ,par♥)→ ♥(q1, . . . , qar♥)
for every modal operator ♥ ∈ Λ. The reason is that the congruence rule is clearly one-step
sound, and even under the much weaker asssumption of one-step completeness (obtained by
restricting Ξ to be finite in Definition 3.4), all one-step sound rules are derivable [SV].
Example 3.8.
• Modal neighbourhood semantics is axiomatised by
p↔ q
p→ q C
which expresses that  is a congruential operator (where we write p→ q in place of
¬p ∨q for readability). This is the paradigmatic example of S1SC; see the discussion
in Remark 3.10 below.
• The rule set for the normal modal logic K consists of the rules
p→ q1 ∨ . . . ∨ qn
♦p→ ♦q1 ∨ . . . ∨ ♦qn Kn
for all n ≥ 0. As we are going to see in Lemma 3.9, R is finitary S1SC. On the other
hand, for reasons detailed in Remark 3.10, R is not S1SC. An S1SC semantics for this
particular rule set would be provided by normal neighbourhood (i.e., filter) frames.
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• For graded modal logic, the proof of one-step completeness of the rule set
p→ q
♦n+1p→ ♦nq RG1
r → p ∨ q
♦n1+n2r → ♦n1p ∨ ♦n2q A1
p→ r q → r p ∧ q → s
♦n1p ∨ ♦n2q → ♦n1+n2+1r ∨ ♦0s A2
¬p
¬♦0p RN
[SV, Lemma 3.10] upon inspection effectively establishes finitary S1SC.
• For positive Presburger modal logic, we similarly have that the proof of one-step com-
pleteness of a natural rule system for full Presburger modal logic [KP10, Lemma 4.5]
straightforwardly adapts to a) positive Presburger modal logic, and b) finitary S1SC,
provided that one generalizes the semantics to infinite multisets as we do here.
• Conditional logic provides a curious mixed case, due to its being neighbourhood-like in
one coordinate and Kripke-like in another. We will introduce adequate apparatus and
analyse it further in Example 3.16.
• In Remark 3.11, we discuss the issue of S1SC of coalition logic interpreted over effectivity
functions.
Lemma 3.9. The Λ-structure for relational modal logic (Section 2) is finitary S1SC.
Proof. Consider any consistent Ξ ⊆ Prop(Λ(PfinX)), where Λ = {♦}; w.l.o.g., Ξ is maximally
consistent. We need to find A ∈ PX s.t. A PX Ξ. Let us choose
A = {x | ♦{x} ∈ Ξ}.
One shows by induction on formulas that
A PX φ iff φ ∈ Ξ.
The only non-trivial case is the modal one. For any B = {b1, . . . , bn} ∈ PfinX, we have that
A PX ♦B iff ∃i ≤ n.A PX ♦{bi}
iff ∃i ≤ n.♦{bi} ∈ Ξ
iff ♦B = ♦{b1} ∪ · · · ∪ ♦{bn} ∈ Ξ.
Remark 3.10. As noted in [SP10c, Remark 55], we can give a more abstract characteri-
zation of S1SC, recognizable also to readers familiar with more categorical presentations
of coalgebraic modal logic (cf., e.g., [KR12]). Every signature Λ together with a given
set of one-step axiom schemes (equivalently, one-step rules) can be encoded disregarding
concrete syntax by its functorial presentation [KKP04] (cf. also [SP10c, Definition 28]) as
an endofunctor LΛ on the category BA of Boolean algebras. BA is dually adjoint to Set,
with the adjunction given by the contravariant powerset functor2 Q and the functor S taking
a Boolean algebra to the set of its ultrafilters:
BALΛ
++
S
33 Set
Q
ss
T
ss
(3.1)
The information contained in each Λ-structure can be then more abstractly encoded by δ :
LΛQ → QT [KKP04] and the canonical structure for Λ is given by MΛ = SLΛQ. Coalgebras
for the canonical structure can equivalently be described as generalized neighbourhood
frames (where by generalized we mean that for every n-ary modality in Λ, we have n-ary
2We write here Q to stress that we change the target category.
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neighbourhoods, i.e. subsets of the n-th power of the state set), subject to satisfaction of
the frame conditions embodied in the given one-step rules [SP10c, Remark 34]. For every
Λ-structure, we can define a canonical structure morphism [SP10c, p. 1121] to MΛ by
composing the counit of the above adjunction with Sδ, and S1SC effectively requires that
this structure morphism is surjective. In other words, a Λ-structure is S1SC iff its functor
surjects onto the canonical neighbourhood semantics; it is for this reason that we refer to
the S1SC case as “neighbourhood-like”. In fact, as we explain in the next remark, we do not
currently have an in-the-wild example of an S1SC structure that is not actually isomorphic
to the canonical neighbourhood semantics.
Remark 3.11. Coalition logic [Pau02] and, essentially equivalently, the next-step fragment
of alternating-time temporal logic [AHK02], have modalities [Q] indexed over coalitions Q,
which are subsets of a fixed finite set N of agents ; the operator [Q] reads ‘the coalition Q of
players can enforce . . . in the next step’. The semantics is formulated over structures called
game frames or concurrent game structures, i.e., coalgebras for the functor
GX = {((Si)i∈N , f :
(∏
i∈N Si
)→ X) | ∅ 6= Si ⊆ N}
where Si is thought of as the set of moves available to agent i ∈ N and f is an outcome
function that determines the next state of the game, depending on the moves chosen by the
agents (we restrict to finitely many moves per agent as in alternating-time temporal logic).
For notational convenience, given a coalition Q = {q1, . . . , qk} ⊆ N and moves sq1 ∈ Sq1 ,
. . . , sqk ∈ Sqk , we write sQ = (sq)q∈Q and SQ = Sq1 × · · · × Sqk (so that sQ ∈ SQ). Given
sQ ∈ SQ and sN\Q ∈ SN\Q, we write (sQ, sN\Q) for the evident induced element of SN .
An alternative semantics of the coalitional operators is provided by effectivity functions.
These are functions E assigning to each coalition Q a set E(Q) of properties that Q can
enforce. Explicitly, a concurrent game G = ((Si)i∈P , f) ∈ GX induces an effectivity function
EG by
EG(Q) = {A ⊆ X | ∃sQ ∈ SQ.∀sN\Q ∈ SN\Q. f(sQ, sN\Q) ∈ A}.
Effectivity functions congregate into a functor E , a subfunctor of a product of neighbourhood
functors. The modal operators [Q] are interpreted over effectivity functions in the usual
style of neighbourhood semantics, i.e. by
[[[Q]]]X(A) = {E ∈ EX | A ∈ E(Q)}.
Composing this semantics with the above-defined projection from concurrent games to
effectivity functions yields the interpretation of the coalitional modalities [Q] over G; this
reproduces the standard semantics of coalition logic and alternating time temporal logic.
Now Theorem 3.2 in [Pau02] states that an effectivity function E ∈ E(X) is of the form
EG for some G ∈ GX iff it is playable, i.e. satisfies the following properties:
• For all Q, ∅ /∈ E(Q) 3 X
• E is outcome-mononotic, i.e. each E(Q) is upwards closed under set inclusion.
• E is N -maximal, i.e. for all A ⊆ X, either X \A ∈ E(∅) or A ∈ E(N).
• E is superadditive, i.e. whenever A1 ∈ E(Q1) and A2 ∈ E(Q2) for disjoint coalitions
Q1, Q2, then A1 ∩A2 ∈ E(Q1 ∪Q2).
If this were the case, then coalition logic interpreted over either concurrent games or
playable effectivity functions would be S1SC, and we claimed as much in the conference
version [LPSS12]: The above conditions amount to playable effectivity functions being just
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neighbourhood systems that satisfy a set of one-step rules:
¬[Q]⊥ [Q]> p→ q
[Q]p→ [Q]q
p ∨ q
[∅]p ∨ [N ]q
p ∧ q → r
[Q1]p ∧ [Q2]q → [Q1 ∪Q2]r for Q1 ∩Q2 = ∅,
and such structures are always S1SC (this is by the development in [SP10c], see in particular
Remarks 34 and 55 in op. cit., and also Remark 3.10 above). However, it turns out that
Theorem 3.2 in [Pau02] is not in fact entirely correct, and once fixed no longer implies that
coalition logic is S1SC. To see this, note that for every effectivity function of the form EG,
EG(∅) must have a least element, equivalently be closed under intersections: every element
of EG(∅) must contain the set
A = {f(sN ) | sN ∈ SN},
and this set is itself in EG(∅). This condition is however not satisfied by all playable effectivity
functions in the above sense: take X to be some infinite set, pick a non-principal ultrafilter
U on X, and put E(Q) = U for all coalitions Q. This defines a playable effectivity function
but E(∅) = U has no least element. Adding the condition that E(∅) has a least element to
the definition of playability does fix the theorem, but this condition is not expressible by a
finitary one-step axiom and hence we do not obtain S1SC for coalition logic as a corollary.
As indicated above, we have alternative conditions that ensure completeness [SP10b]:
Definition 3.12. A modal operator ♥ is k-bounded in the i-th argument for k ∈ N and
with respect to a Λ-structure T if for every C ∈ Set and every ~A ⊆ C,
[[♥]]C(A1, . . . , An) =
⋃
B⊆Ai,#B≤k
[[♥]]C(A1, . . . , Ai−1, B,Ai+1, . . . , An). (3.2)
Boundedness of ♥ in the i-th argument implies in particular that ♥ is monotonic in the
i-th argument. We can replace the assumption that the rule set R is S1SC with the weaker
assumption that R is finitary S1SC, provided that modal operators are bounded on respective
coordinates. The technical details of a suitably general setup are as follows:
Definition 3.13.
• A boundedness signature for Λ is a function [Λ assigning to every ♥ ∈ Λ a vector of
elements of N ∪ {∞} of length ar♥, i.e. an element of (N ∪ {∞})ar♥.
• Being ∞-bounded is a condition trivially satisfied by all operators, i.e., every operator is
“∞-bounded” in each coordinate.
• We say that [Λ is adequate for a Λ-structure over T if every modal operator ♥ ∈ Λ is
[Λ(♥)(i)-bounded in i every i ≤ ar♥.
• We say that Λ is [Λ-bounded w.r.t T if [Λ is adequate for the structure in question and
the codomain of [Λ does not contain ∞.
• We say that Λ is bounded w.r.t. T if it is [Λ-bounded w.r.t. T for some [Λ. That is, every
modal operator ♥ ∈ Λ for every i ≤ ar♥ is k♥,i-bounded in i for some k♥,i <∞.
Example 3.14. Here are some examples of boundedness signatures adequate for structures
under consideration:
• for the neighbourhood case, [Λ() = (∞),
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• for the Kripke case, [Λ(♦) = (1):
if B ∈ [[♦]]C(A), then B ∩A 6= ∅ by definition. So fix c ∈ B ∩A; then B ∈ [[♦]]C({c}),
• for graded modalities, [Λ(〈k〉) = (k + 1):
if µ ∈ [[〈k〉]]C(A), then µ(A) > k. Hence there exist (not necessarily distinct) elements
c1, . . . , ck+1 ∈ C such that µ({c1, . . . , ck+1}) > k, i.e. µ ∈ [[〈k〉]]C({c1, . . . , ck+1}),
• for positive Presburger logic,
[Λ(Lk(a1, . . . , an)) = ((k + 1) div a1 + 1, . . . , (k + 1) div an + 1),
• for the discrete distribution functor D, [Λ(〈p〉) = (∞),
• for its finite variant Dk, [Λ(〈n/k〉) = (n),
• for non-monotonic conditionals, [Λ(>) = (∞, 1).
Note that, e.g., the neighbourhood modality clearly fails to be bounded. Boundedness allows
us to broaden the scope of our completeness results to setups where full S1SC would be too
much to ask, i.e., to leave the neighbourhood-like setting. This is done by requiring S1SC
on suitable coordinates only for valuations of schematic variables in finite sets. Modalities
which are both finitary S1SC and bounded will be called Kripke-like. In order to make this
precise so that we can cover mixed cases, such as those of non-monotonic conditionals, some
care is needed.
Definition 3.15.
• The colouring function [[ : N∪{∞} → {fin,∞} assigns fin to elements of N and [[(∞) =∞.
It is extended pointwise to (N ∪ {∞})ar♥ and [[Λ is defined as the composition of [Λ with
this pointwise extension.
• Let c : sVar→ {fin,∞} be a colouring of the set of schematic variables. Define the set of
[[Λ, c-coloured modalities as
[[Λc = {♥p1 . . .parΛ |p1 . . .parΛ ∈ sVar and (cp1, . . . , cparΛ) = [[Λ(♥)}.
• A valuation τ : sVar→ P(C) respects c iff τ(pi) ∈ Pcpi , where we recall that Pfin is finite
powerset, and P∞ is simply P.
• A Gentzen-style one-step rule R is [[Λ, c-compatible if it is of the form
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 · · · Γk ⇒ ∆k
ΓR ⇒ ∆R (R)
where
– Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆1, . . . ,∆k are multisets of elements of sVar,
– ΓR and ∆R are multisets of elements of [[Λc.
• For a Gentzen-style rule, write [[Λc(R) for the set of [[Λ, c-compatible variants of R
obtained by renaming of schematic variables. For a Hilbert-style rule, [[Λc(R) is obtained
via its Gentzen-style counterpart. Finally, [[Λc(R) = {[[Λc(R) | R ∈ R}.
• A set Ξ ⊆ Rank1(sVar) is c-consistent wrt τ if its union with the set
{Pσ | σ : sVar→ Prop(sVar) and A/P ∈ [[Λc(R) s.t. C, τ |= Aσ}
is propositionally consistent.
• We say that a set of rules R is [Λ-S1SC if
for every C ∈ Set, any Ξ ⊆ Rank1(sVar), any colouring c and any τ respecting c,
Ξ is one-step satisfiable wrt τ whenever it is c-consistent wrt τ .
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Table 1: Hilbert-style Calculus HR
The axioms are modelled after those of Enderton [End01].
Everywhere below, ∀~y. denotes a sequence of universal quantifiers of arbitrary length, possibly empty.
En1: all propositional tautologies. These can be axiomatized, e.g., by
• ∀~y. (φ→ (ψ → φ))
• ∀~y. ((φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ)))
• ∀~y. (⊥ → φ)
• ∀~y. (((φ→ ⊥)→ ⊥)→ φ)
For En2 and Alpha below, recall that whenever we write a substitution we implicitly impose
the assumption that the substituted term is actually substitutable.
En2: ∀~y.(∀x.φ→ φ[z/x])
En3: ∀~y.(∀x.(φ→ ψ)→ (∀x.φ→ ∀x.ψ))
En4: ∀~y.(φ→ ∀x.φ) if x is fresh for φ
En5: ∀~y.(x = x)
En6.1: ∀~y.(x = z → P (~u, x,~v)→ P (~u, z,~v)) for P ∈ Σ ∪ {=}
En6.2: ∀~y.(x = z → x♥dy1 :φ1e . . . dyn :φne → z♥dy1 :φ1e . . . dyn :φne)
Alpha: ∀~y((x♥ . . . dz : φe . . . )→ (x♥ . . . du : φ[u/z]e . . . ))
Onestep(R): ∀~y.∀z.(∀x.Aσ → [σ, x, z]P ) where
• A/P ranges over the one-step rules in R, and
• σ is a substitution sending each pi to a formula of L, and [σ, x, z] is the inductive extension
of the map sending each ♥i ~pi to z♥idx : σ(p1i )e · · · dx : σ(pa(i)i )e)
BdPL[Λ: An additional axiom scheme when [Λ(♥)(i) 6=∞, with ~z fresh for yi, ~φ
∀~y.(x♥ . . . dyi : φie . . .↔ ∃z1 . . . z[Λ(i).(
∧
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
φi[zj/yi] ∧ x♥ . . . dyi :
∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
yi = zje . . . ))
That is, the notion of [Λ-S1SC instantiates to finitary S1SC in bounded arguments, and to
S1SC in unbounded ones.
Example 3.16. In the case of the modal signature {>} of non-monotonic conditionals
with [Λ(>) = (∞, 1), the associated one-step completeness condition may be called (S1SC,
finitary S1SC ) [SP10b]. A suitable axiomatization can be extracted from existing references
[Che80, SP10c, PS10, SP10b]:
p→ q1 ∨ . . . ∨ qn
r > p→ r > q1 ∨ . . . ∨ r > qn RCK
p↔ q
p > r → q > r RE
A proof that this axiomatization is indeed [Λ-S1SC combines the neighbourhood argument
in the first coordinate (cf. Remark 3.10) with the Kripke argument in the second (cf.
Lemma 3.9).
3.2. Hilbert-style Calculus. We are finally ready to present our axioms for CPL in Table 1.
Axioms En1–En6 are just those of Enderton, with En6.2 an additional clause to cover the
case of modal formulas. The α-renaming axiom Alpha is needed because our syntax features
separate comprehension variables. Our Onestep(R) axiom scheme generalizes what was
originally just the congruence rule (Remark 3.7) in Chang’s formalism, corresponding to the
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fact that the S1SC rule system for neighbourhood semantics consists of only the congruence
rule. Axiom BdPL[Λ applies to operators that are bounded in suitable coordinates. It
is important to notice that boundedness is not expressible as a sentence or formula in
weak frameworks; in languages like HΛ(@), it can only be expressed by a non-standard rule
[SP10b].
Let Γ,∆ ⊆ CPL(Λ,Σ), let R be a set of one-step rules and φ ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ). Write
Γ `HR[Λ φ if there are γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γ s.t. γ1 → . . .→ γn → φ can be deduced from En1–En6,
Alpha, Onestep(R) and BdPL[Λ in Table 1 using only Modus Ponens. This clearly
defines a finitary deducibility relation in the sense of Goldblatt [Gol93, Sec. 8.1] and being
`HR[Λ -consistent is equivalent with being finitely `HR[Λ -consistent in his sense, that is, Γ `HR[Λ ⊥
iff there is Γ0 ⊆fin Γ s.t. Γ0 `HR[Λ ⊥.
Theorem 3.17 (Soundness). Whenever a Λ-structure over T is adequate for [Λ, all the
axioms in Table 1 hold in every coalgebraic Λ-model and the set of formulas valid in such a
model is closed under `HR[Λ .
Recall that by Convention 3.3, one-step soundness of R is not mentioned explicitly.
Definition 3.18. For any Λ, R and [Λ, we say that the inference system given by `HR[Λ is
strongly complete for a given Λ-structure based on T if for any set of sentences Γ ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ),
Γ 6`HR[Λ ⊥ holds if and only if there is a coalgebraic Λ-model for Γ.
Theorem 3.19 (Strong Completeness). Whenever a set of rules R is [Λ-S1SC for a
Λ-structure over T that is adequate for [Λ, then `HR[Λ is strongly complete for this structure.
Example 3.20. For concrete instances of this completeness result, combine Examples 3.8,
3.14 and 3.16.
3.3. Proof of The Completeness Theorem. First, we introduce machinery proposed in
[Gol93]. Consider any Fr ⊆ CPL(Λ,Σ) closed under propositional connectives. Fr can be,
for example, the set of all formulas whose free variables are contained in a fixed subset of
iVar, the set of all sentences and the entire CPL(Λ,Σ) itself being the two borderline cases.
Any set Inf ⊆ P(Fr)× Fr will be called, following Goldblatt, a set of inferences. For any
inf = (Π, χ) ∈ Inf and any Γ ⊆ Fr, we say that
• Γ respects inf if Γ `HR[Λ χ whenever Γ `HR[Λ φ for all φ ∈ Π,• Γ is closed under inf if χ ∈ Γ whenever Π ⊆ Γ,
• Γ respects Inf iff it respects each member of Inf ,
• Γ is closed under Inf iff it is closed under each member of Inf .
Theorem 3.21 (Goldblatt’s Abstract Henkin Principle [Gol93]). If Inf is a set of inferences
in Fr of an infinite cardinality κ and Γ is a `HR[Λ -consistent subset of Fr satisfying in addition:
∀X ⊆ Fr.|X| < κ implies that Γ ∪X respects Inf (3.3)
(i.e., every κ-finite extension of Γ respects Inf ), then Γ has a maximally `HR[Λ -consistent
extension in Fr which is closed under Inf .
Remark 3.22. We emphasize that speaking about inferences in Goldblatt’s sense being
infinite sets does not mean that deductions in the axiom system for for CPL use infinitary
rules. As stated above, the only inference rule in our system is ordinary Modus Ponens.
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Even the one-step rules defined above (which are not infinitary anyway) can be written as
sentence schemes Onestep thanks to the use of quantifiers.
We further point out that an Enderton-style axiomatization does not involve the
generalization rule: if x is a free variable in φ, it is not necessarily the case that φ `HR[Λ ∀x.φ
(this is not in contradiction to completeness: the rule is sound in the sense that validity of
the premise implies validity of the conclusion, but its conclusion is not a logical consequence
of its premise). This makes it enjoy a rather rare property for an axiomatization of FOL:
a deduction theorem in exactly the same form as propositional logic, i.e., Γ ∪ {φ} `HR[Λ ψ
iff Γ `HR[Λ φ → ψ (cf. [End01, p. 118]). This will also allow us to give our Henkin-style
proofs without introducing additional constants—the role of Henkin constants for existentially
quantified variables will be played by the variables themselves.3 The only disadvantage
of this approach would be that if we consider uncountable Λ or Σ, we would also need to
allow uncountably many elements of iVar, something we highlight in the statement of several
lemmas and claims below.
Let us recall the crucial ingredient in Henkin-style completeness proofs: the notion of quasi-
Henkin model and its associated Truth Lemma. This is inspired by previously announced
completeness proofs for coalgebraic hybrid logic [SP10b]; we discuss the relationship in detail
in Remark 3.29 and § 4 below.
Definition 3.23. Let Γ be a maximal consistent set (MCS) of formulas. Define CΓ =
{|x| : x is a variable}, where |x| = {z : x = z ∈ Γ}, and put IΓ(P ) ={(|x1|, . . . , |xn|) :
P (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Γ}. Set φ̂yi ={|z| : φ[z/yi] ∈ Γ}, to be thought of as the set of variables
satisfying φ according to Γ (when yi is taken to be the argument variable or the context hole).
Given a T -coalgebra structure γ : CΓ → TCΓ, we say that (CΓ, γ, IΓ) is a quasi-Henkin
coalgebraic model if, for any variables x, y1, . . . , yn and any formulas ψ, φ1, . . . , φn,
∃x.ψ ∈ Γ =⇒ for some yi, yi ∈ ψ̂x. (3.4)
(note that the converse implication holds for any MCS) and
x♥dy1 : φ1e · · · dyn : φne ∈ Γ⇐⇒ γ(|x|) ∈ J♥KCΓ(φ̂1y1 , . . . , φ̂nyn). (3.5)
In a quasi-Henkin model, define the canonical variable assignment vΓ by vΓ(x) = |x|.
Lemma 3.24 (Truth Lemma). Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of formulas and MΓ =
(CΓ, γ, IΓ) a quasi-Henkin coalgebraic model. Then, for every formula φ,
MΓ, vΓ |= φ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ. (3.6)
Proof. By induction on φ. An auxiliary fact we need is that whenever φ satisfies the inductive
claim (3.6), then JφKyMΓ = φ̂y (3.7)
(recall JφKy is defined in (2.1)), which can be shown in the following way. Let |z| ∈ CΓ. Then
we have
MΓ, vΓ[|z|/y] |= φ⇐⇒MΓ, vΓ |= φ[z/y]
⇐⇒ φ[z/y] ∈ Γ by (3.6),
3Recall that we have been working in a setup without functions symbols (including 0-ary ones) anyway;
extending our original syntax with constants just for the sake of this particular proof does not even seem
particularly hygienic.
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as desired.
The base case of induction for atomic formulas follows now from the definitions of CΓ and
IΓ, the Boolean cases from the fact that we are dealing with a MCS, and the case for quantifiers
directly from Condition 3.4. For the modal case, where φ ≡ x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne:
MΓ, vΓ |= x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne ⇐⇒ γ(vΓ(x)) ∈ J♥KMΓ(Jφ1Ky1MΓ , . . . , JφnKynMΓ) by def.
⇐⇒ γ(|x|) ∈ J♥KMΓ(φ̂1y1 , . . . , φ̂nyn) by (3.7)
⇐⇒ x♥dy1 : φ1e · · · dyn : φne ∈ Γ by (3.5).
Next, we need to find a suitable candidate for an MCS from which to build our quasi-Henkin
model. Consider the following sets of inferences:
Inf namea ={〈{φ[z/x] | z ∈ iVar}, ∀x.φ〉 | φ ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ), x ∈ iVar}
Inf nameb ={〈{(φ1 ↔ ψ1) [z/x], . . . , (φn ↔ ψn) [z/x] | z ∈ iVar},
∀x. (x♥dx : φ1e . . . dx : φne ↔ x♥dx : ψ1e . . . dx : ψne)〉 | ~φ, ~ψ ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ), x ∈ iVar}
Inf name =Inf namea ∪ Inf nameb
Inf [Λ ={〈{
∧
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
φi[zj/yi]→ ¬x♥ . . . dyi :
∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
yi = zje · · · | ~z ∈ iVar},
¬x♥ . . . dyi : φie . . . 〉 | ~φ ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ), x ∈ iVar,♥ ∈ Λ, [Λ(♥)(i) 6=∞}
Inf =Inf name ∪ Inf [Λ
Let us begin with
Claim 3.25. Assume |iVar| = κ ≥ |Λ ∪ Σ ∪ ω|. Then any `HR[Λ -consistent set of formulas Γ
s.t. |{x ∈ iVar | x fresh for Γ}| = κ (in particular, any consistent set of sentences) satisfies
condition 3.3 of Theorem 3.21 for Inf name.
Proof. We begin by observing that
(a) If Γ′ `HR[Λ φ[z/x] and z is fresh for Γ′, x, φ, then Γ′ `HR[Λ ∀x.φ
The proof of this fact is perfectly standard, but working with an Enderton-style axiom-
atization is particularly convenient for such reasoning: We have a finite Γ′0 ⊆fin Γ′ s.t.
Γ′0 `HR[Λ φ[z/x]. Then one uses the Deduction Theorem (cf. Remark 3.22) to obtain
`HR[Λ
∧
Γ′0 → φ[z/x]. However, even with an Enderton-style axiomatization it is still the
case4 that `HR[Λ χ implies `HR[Λ ∀z.χ, hence `HR[Λ ∀z.(
∧
Γ′0 → φ[z/x]). The rest is an easy
exercise using En3, En4 and renaming of bound variables thanks to En2.
The condition (a) tells us that Γ itself does respect Inf namea by assumption. But if
|X| < κ, then there are κ-many z ∈ iVar that are fresh for Γ ∪X ∪ {φ}. For any such z, (a)
would hold also for Γ′ = Γ ∪X. This gives condition 3.3 for Inf namea.
For Inf nameb, let us observe that (a) allows to infer that
If Γ′ `HR[Λ (φ1 ↔ ψ1) [z/x] ∧ · · · ∧ (φn ↔ ψn) [z/x] and z fresh for Γ′, ~φ, ~ψ, x, then
Γ `HR[Λ ∀x. ((φ1 ↔ ψ1) ∧ · · · ∧ (φn ↔ ψn)).
4In fact, a variant of the Generalization Theorem is available even for non-empty contexts as long as the
quantified variable does not occur freely therein, cf. [End01, p. 117].
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Now an application of the congruence rule (Remark 3.7) completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 3.26. Assume |iVar| = κ ≥ |Λ ∪ Σ ∪ ω|. Then any `HR[Λ -consistent set of formulas
Γ s.t. |{x ∈ iVar | x fresh for Γ}| = κ (in particular, a consistent set of sentences) satisfies
condition 3.3 of Theorem 3.21 for Inf [Λ.
Proof. We begin by observing that
(b) If Γ′ `HR[Λ ¬(
∧
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
φi[zj/yi] ∧ x♥ . . . dyi :
∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
yi = zje . . . ) for some
~z fresh for Γ′, x, yi, ~φ, then Γ′ `HR[Λ ¬x♥ . . . dyi : φie . . .
This is shown by first following the proof of (a) and finding a finite Γ′0 ⊆fin Γ′ s.t.
`HR[Λ Γ′0 → ¬∃z1, . . . , z[Λ(♥)(i).(
∧
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
φi[zj/yi] ∧ x♥ . . . dyi :
∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
yi = zje . . . ).
Applying BdPL[Λ proves (b).
The condition (b) tells us that Γ itself does respect Inf [Λ by assumption. But if |X| < κ,
then there are κ-many z ∈ iVar which are fresh for Γ ∪X ∪ {φ1, . . . , φar♥} and distinct from
x and ~y. For any tuple of such z’s, (b) would hold also for Γ′ = Γ ∪X. This gives condition
3.3 for Inf [Λ.
Claim 3.27. Assume |iVar| = κ ≥ |Λ ∪ Σ ∪ ω|. Then any `HR[Λ -consistent set of formulas
Γ s.t. |{x ∈ iVar | x fresh for Γ}| = κ (in particular, a consistent set of sentences) can be
extended to a maximally `HR[Λ -consistent set of formulas Γ′ s.t.
• whenever ∃x.φ ∈ Γ′, then φ[z/x] ∈ Γ′ for some z ∈ iVar
• whenever ∃x. (x♥dx : φ1e . . . dx : φne ∧ ¬x♥dx : ψ1e . . . dx : ψne) ∈ Γ′, then there is
z ∈ iVar and i ≤ n s.t. ¬ (φi ↔ ψi) [z/x] ∈ Γ′.
• whenever x♥ . . . dyi : φie · · · ∈ Γ′ and [Λ(♥)(i) 6= ∞, then there are z1, . . . , z[Λ(♥)(i) s.t.
x♥ . . . dyi :
∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
yi = zje · · · ∈ Γ′ and moreover φi[zj/yi] ∈ Γ′ for each j ≤ [Λ(♥)(i).
Proof. This immediately follows from the preceding Claim, Theorem 3.21 and the fact Γ′ is
a MCS.
Proof of Theorem 3.19. Recall Definition 3.23. We will build our quasi-Henkin model using
Γ′. Satisfaction of condition 3.4 follows then directly from the first item in Claim 3.27, i.e.,
from being closed under Inf namea. Hence, we just need to define a transition structure γ on
CΓ′ and for this purpose, we need to find for each |x| a suitable t ∈ TCΓ′ s.t. when γ(|x|) is
defined as t, the condition 3.5 is satisfied.
Assume then Rank1 has enough schematic variables to name all elements of CPL(Λ,Σ);
let pφ be the schematic variable corresponding to φ under some fixed assignment. For each
x, we can define an evaluation τx(pψ) = ψ̂
x. Note that for each pair of distinct x and y we
have that τx(px=y) is a singleton, thanks to the definition of CΓ′ .
Thus, let us define for each x ∈ iVar the set
Ψx := {♥pψ◦1 . . .pψ◦n | ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ) and (x♥dx :ψ
◦
1e . . . dx :ψ◦ne) ∈ Γ′},
where  is either nothing or negation and for each i ≤ ar♥, ψ◦i is either:
• ψi itself, if [Λ(♥)(i) =∞ or
• ∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
x = zj otherwise, where z1, . . . , z[Λ(♥)(i) are s.t.
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– x♥ . . . dx : ∨
j≤[Λ(♥)(i)
x = zje · · · ∈ Γ′ and moreover
– ψi[zj/x] ∈ Γ′ for each j ≤ [Λ(♥)(i).
Furthermore, let us define a colouring cx of schematic variables which assigns fin to
every p ∨
j≤m
x=zm , where z1, . . . , zm is any finite sequence of variables and ∞ to every other
pψ. It is clear that τx respects cx. We have:
Claim 3.28. Ψx is cx-consistent wrt τx, i.e.,
Ψx ∪ {Pσ | σ : sVar→ Prop(sVar) and A/P ∈ [[Λc(R) s.t. CΓ′ , τx |= Aσ}.
is propositionally consistent.
Proof. Assume it is not. By compactness of the classical propositional calculus, a contra-
diction can be then derived already from a certain finite subset of Ψx and finitely many
Pσ s.t. A/P ∈ [[Λc(R) and CΓ′ , τx |= Aσ. Given the definition of τx and Ψx, this directly
contradicts the fact that Γ′ is supposed to be a MCS closed under all instances of axioms
Onestep(R) and BdPL[Λ in Table 1.
By Definition 3.15 of [Λ-S1SC, Claim 3.28 implies that Ψx is one-step satisfiable wrt τx,
i.e.,⋂
φ∈ΨxJφKTCΓ′ ,τx = {[[♥]]C′Γψ̂◦1x . . . ψ̂◦nx | ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ CPL(Λ,Σ) and
(x♥dx :ψ◦1e . . . dx :ψ◦ne) ∈ Γ′} 6= ∅.
Now use the Axiom of Choice to define γ(|x|) to be a representative of this non-empty
intersection for every |x| (strictly speaking, for an arbitrarily chosen representative of this
equivalence relation), automatically yielding the condition 3.5 of Definition 3.23.
Remark 3.29. The similarities and differences between CPL and languages like HΛ(@)
and its extensions to be discussed in § 4 are best appreciated by comparing the proof of
Theorem 3.19 with earlier hybrid ones [SP10b]. In the predicate case:
• not only one-step rules, but also non-standard naming and pasting rules of [SP10b] can
be expressed as ordinary first-order axioms.
• As we are going to discuss now, the Henkin-style completeness proof directly leads to the
Omitting Types theorem. It is not clear how to obtain such a result for a language like
HΛ(@) studied in [SP10b]; the presence of a binding and/or quantification mechanism
seems essential in the proof. Recall again that the presence of such a mechanism also
allowed us to reuse (equivalence classes of) variables as building block of models instead
of Henkin-style constants.
3.4. Omitting Types Theorem. The Omitting Types Theorem is a standard result of
model theory. Goldblatt [Gol93, § 8.2] shows how to establish it using the Abstract Henkin
Principle. Here is a more detailed description how to obtain it in our setting. In this section,
we assume that the entire CPL(Λ,Σ) is countable and we keep these countable Λ and Σ
fixed and implicit.
Fix a finite subset of iVar {x1, . . . , xk} and denote the set of all formulas whose free
variables are contained in {x1, . . . , xk} as CPL(k). Thus, the set of sentences can be
written as CPL(0). Recall that a k-type (sometimes called a complete type) is a maximal
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consistent subset of CPL(k); sometimes, one also uses the term partial type for consistent
yet not maximal subsets of CPL(k). For any given Γ ⊆ CPL(0) and any (partial or total)
k-type ∆, say that ∆ is principal over Γ if there is φ ∈ CPL(k) consistent with Γ s.t.
∀ψ ∈ ∆.Γ `HR[Λ φ→ ψ. Note here that for complete types, we can assume that φ ∈ ∆. Say
that a model M = (C, γ, I) realizes a (partial or total) k-type ∆ if
⋂
ψ∈∆
JψKx1,...,xkC 6= ∅, where
as before JφKx1,...,xkC = {(c1, . . . , ck) ∈ C |M, v[c1/x1] . . . [ck/xk] |= φ};
a k-type is omitted by M if it is not realized by it.
Note that for complete types, one consequence of being non-principal is that ∆ is
neither entailed by Γ nor inconsistent with it (maximal consistent sets are closed under finite
conjuctions).
Theorem 3.30 (Omitting Types). Whenever a set of rules R is [Λ-S1SC for a Λ-structure
over T that is adequate for [Λ, Γ is a consistent set of sentences and ∆ is a (complete or
partial) k-type non-principal over Γ, Γ has a model omitting ∆.
Proof. We only need to refine somewhat the proof of the completeness theorem by using a
richer set of inferences than Inf . Consider
Inf∆ = Inf ∪ {〈{σ[z1 . . . zk/x1 . . . xk] | σ ∈ ∆},⊥〉 | z1, . . . , zk distinct els. of iVar}
(we have not formally defined simultaneous substitution, but it should be clear how to extend
conventions introduced in § 2). We claim that the condition 3.3 of Theorem 3.21 is satisfied
with κ = ω. For assume it is not. Then there exists a finite set ∆ ⊆ CPL and a finite tuple
of distinct variables z1, . . . , zk s.t. (*) Γ ∪∆ is consistent but
Γ `HR[Λ
∧
∆→ σ[z1 . . . zk/x1 . . . xk] for every σ ∈ ∆.
Let ~z′ be a sequence containing all the variables in ∆ different from z1 . . . zk and δ = ∃~z′.
∧
∆.
Then we have
(**) Γ `HR[Λ δ → σ[z1 . . . zk/x1 . . . xk] for every σ ∈ ∆
and consequently, setting δ′ to be δ[x1 . . . xk/z1 . . . zk]
(***) Γ `HR[Λ δ′ → σ for every σ ∈ ∆
(in deriving (**) and (***) we obviously use the fact that Γ is a set of sentences).
At the same time, Γ being a set of sentences yields that δ′ is consistent with Γ by virtue
of (*). This entails a contradiction with non-principality of ∆ over Γ. The rest proceeds as
in the completeness proof.
Remark 3.31. Goldblatt [Gol93, § 8.2] points out this can be extended to simultaneously
omitting a countable set of non-principal types.
Here is a typical application adapted from the monograph of Chang and Keisler [CK90, Ch
2.2, p. 83]: ω-logic, ω-rule and ω-completeness.
Given any T , Λ and R within the scope of our completeness result, extend Λ with a
countable family of propositional atoms (cf. Definition 2.2) { isn | n ∈ N} ∪ { is nat}. By
similar considerations as in Remark 2.3, the completeness result is not affected by such
extensions.
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Remark 3.32. Of course, we could alternatively extended Σ with corresponding predicate
symbols, which would be even easier from the point of view of directly applying Theorems 3.21
and 3.30, but would also have a less coalgebraic flavour.
Consider now the following set of sentences in the extended language:
ΓN = {∀x.x isn→ (x is nat ∧ ¬x ism) | n,m ∈ N, n 6= m}∪
{∀x, y.x isn ∧ y isn→ x = y | n ∈ N}∪
{∃x.x isn | n ∈ N}.
An ω-model is any model of ΓN where, moreover, the denotation of is nat is the set-theoretical
sum of all “ isn”. A theory Γ is ω-complete if Γ ∪ ΓN is closed under the ω-rule:
∀x.x isn→ φ(x) n ∈ N
∀x.x is nat→ φ(x) ω
One can use the Omitting Types theorem to show the following:
Corollary 3.33. Assume that a set of rules R is [Λ-S1SC for a Λ-structure over T is
adequate for [Λ, and Γ is a set of sentences s.t. Γ ∪ ΓN is consistent. If Γ is ω-complete,
then Γ has an ω-model.
Sketch. Consider
∆(x) = {¬(x isn) | n ∈ N} ∪ {x is nat}.
Pick any φ(x) ∈ CPL(1) s.t. x is nat ∧ φ(x) is consistent with Γ ∪ ΓN . Then
Γ ∪ ΓN 6`HR[Λ ∀x.(x is nat→ ¬φ(x))
=⇒ Γ ∪ ΓN 6`HR[Λ ∀x.(x isn→ ¬φ(x)) for some n ∈ N (by ω − completeness),
⇐⇒ Γ ∪ ΓN 6`HR[Λ φ(x)→ ¬(x isn) for some n ∈ N.
On the other hand, if
Γ ∪ ΓN `HR[Λ x is nat→ ¬φ(x)
and at the same time
Γ ∪ ΓN `HR[Λ φ(x)→ x is nat,
then φ(x) is inconsistent with Γ ∪ ΓN . Thus, ∆(x) is non-principal over Γ ∪ ΓN and hence,
Γ ∪ ΓN has a model omitting it. Such a model is an ω-model.
As discussed by Chang and Keisler [CK90, Ch 2.2], it follows that we can extend our
deductive apparatus with ΓN as additional axioms and ω-rule as an additional rule of proof
and consistency in this extended system is equivalent to the existence of an ω-model.
Such examples are worth contrasting with the incompleteness result (Theorem 3.37) we
are going to present next.
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3.5. ω-boundedness and Failure of Completeness. In this subsection, we show that
there is a substantial gap between S1SC and finitary S1SC as conditions allowing for strong
completeness, by proving that within a larger class of ω-bounded structures, the bounded
structures are the only ones that satisfy compactness. Here, ω-boundedness of an operator
means informally that its satisfaction can always be established by looking only at a finite
subset of the successors, without however requiring a fixed bound on their number. In
examples for this property, we concentrate on cases additionally satisfying finitary one-step
compactness (Definition 3.5), a condition essentially necessary for overall compactness and
that will moreover become important in our forays into model theory (§ 5). In the whole
subsection, to keep things simple we work with unary ♥ ∈ Λ.
Definition 3.34 (ω-Bounded operators). A modal operator ♥ is ω-bounded if for each set
X and each A ⊆ X,
[[♥]]X(A) =
⋃
B⊆finA
[[♥]]X(B).
Example 3.35 (Nonstandard subdistributions). We generally write S for the discrete
subdistribution functor, i.e. S(X) consists of real-valued discrete measures µ on X such that
µ(X) ≤ 1, and for maps f , µ(f) takes image measures. As a variant of this functor, we
consider the the discrete subdistributions functor Src where measures take values in real-
closed fields. Explicitly: we intend to model Markov chains with non-standard probabilities;
these consist of a set X of states, and at each state x an Rx-valued transition distribution
µx, where Rx is a real-closed field (i.e. a model of the first-order theory of the reals). These
structures are coalgebras for the functor T which maps a set X to the set of pairs (R,µ)
where R is a real-closed field and µ is an R-valued discrete subdistribution on X (again
meaning that µ(X) ≤ 1). This functor is in fact class-valued, which however does not affect
the applicability of our coalgebraic analysis (which never requires iterated application of the
coalgebraic type functor, e.g. it does not use the terminal sequence). We take the modal
signature Λ to consist of the operators 〈p〉 (‘with probability more than p’) for p ∈ [0, 1]∩Q.
We show that the 〈p〉 are ω-bounded and that the arising logic L is finitary one-step
compact. To see the former, let (R,µ) ∈ TX and let A ⊆ X such that µ |= 〈p〉A, i.e.∑
x∈A µ(x) > p. Then there exists B ⊆fin A such that
∑
x∈B µ(x) > p, i.e. µ |= 〈p〉B. Since
〈p〉 is clearly monotone, this implies that [[〈p〉]]X(A) =
⋃
B⊆finA [[〈p〉]]X(B), as required.
To show that L is finitary one-step compact, let Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(Pfin(X))) be finitely
satisfiable. Extend the standard language of real arithmetic with a constant symbol cx for
each element ofX, obtaining a language L. Then satisfaction of a formula in Prop(Λ(Pfin(X)))
by µ ∈ TX translates into a first-order formula over L with cx representing µ(x); specifically,
the translation t commutes with the Boolean connectives and translates formulas 〈p〉A with
A ∈ Pfin(X) into
∑
x∈A cx > p. Applying t to Φ and introducing additional formulas cx ≥ 0
for all x ∈ X and ∑x∈A cx ≤ 1 for all A ∈ Pfin(X) thus produces a finitely satisfiable,
and hence satisfiable, set of first-order formulas over L. A model of this set consists of
a real-closed field R and interpretations cˆx ∈ R of the constants cx such that putting
µ(x) = cˆx defines a discrete subdistribution (note that
∑
x∈A cˆx ≤ 1 for all A ∈ Pfin(X)
implies
∑
x∈X cˆx ≤ 1), which then yields a model (R,µ) of Φ.
Example 3.36 (Zero-dimensional subdistributions). Fix a zero-dimensional closed (hence
compact) subset Z ⊆ [0, 1], e.g. a discrete set or the Cantor space, and let SZ be the
associated zero-dimensional discrete subdistributions functor, i.e. the subfunctor of the
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subdistribution functor S where probabilities of finite sets of states are restricted to take
values in Z:
SZ(X) = {µ ∈ S(X) | ∀A ∈ Pfin(X). µ(A) ∈ Z}.
Moreover, we restrict the probabilities p in operators 〈p〉 to be such that (p, 1] ∩ Z is clopen
in Z; since Z is zero-dimensional, there exist enough such p to separate all values in Z.
As before, all these operators are ω-bounded. It remains to show that the logic is finitary
one-step compact. So let Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(Pfin(X))) be finitely satisfiable. Note that the space
ZX , equipped with the product topology, is compact. We equip SZ(X) with the subspace
topology in ZX . Observe that the condition ∀A ∈ Pfin(X). µ(A) ∈ Z already implies
µ(X) ≤ 1; since for A ∈ Pfin(X), the summation map ZA → Z is continuous (this would
fail for infinite A), it follows that SZ(X) is closed in ZX , hence compact.
By the restriction placed on the indices p in modal operators 〈p〉, and again using
continuity of finite summation, we have that for every formula 〈p〉A with A ∈ Pfin(X), the
extension
[[〈p〉A]] = {µ ∈ SZ(X) | µ(A) > p}
is clopen in SZ(X). As clopen sets are closed under Boolean combinations, we thus have that
the extension of every formula in Prop(Λ(Pfin(X))) is clopen in SZ(X). Let A denote the
family of clopens induced in this way by formulas in Φ. Finite satisfiability of Φ implies that A
has the finite intersection property, and hence has non-empty intersection by compactness
of SZ(X). It follows that Φ is satisfiable.
Structures which are ω-bounded without being k-bounded fail strong completeness. To state
this observation in full generality, we require the notion of propositional atom as defined
previously (Definition 2.2).
Theorem 3.37. Whenever a Λ-structure makes some ♥ ∈ Λ ω-bounded without being
k-bounded for any k ∈ ω, strong completeness fails whenever either Σ contains a predicate
symbol of positive arity or Λ contains a propositional atom.
Proof. Assume P ∈ Σ is a predicate symbol of positive arity, w.l.o.g. unary, and ♥ ∈ Λ is as
in the statement of theorem. Consider
∆(x) ={¬x♥dy : P (y)e} ∪
{∀y1, ..., yk.(P (y1) ∧ · · · ∧ P (yk)→ ¬x♥dy : y = y1 ∨ ... ∨ y = yke) | k ∈ ω}.
Clearly, every finite subset of ∆(x) is satisfiable in a model based on a coalgebra witnessing
the failure of k-boundedness for a suitably large k. However, a coalgebraic model satisfying
the whole ∆(x) would witness the failure of ω-boundedness. This means that ∆(x) is a
counterexample to compactness, and hence no finitary deduction system can be strongly
complete. The proof for the case where Λ contains a propositional atom is entirely analogous.
Example 3.38. The probabilistic instances of CPL given by interpreting the probabilistic
modalities 〈p〉 over nonstandard or zero-dimensional subdistributions, respectively, and are
ω-bounded but fail to be k-bounded for any k. Hence they fail to be compact by Theorem 3.37
(once equipped with propositional atoms) although they satisfy finitary one-step compactness
(Examples 3.35 and 3.36).
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4. Correspondence with Coalgebraic Modal Logic
We next compare the expressivity of CPL with that of various coalgebraic modal and hybrid
logics.
4.1. Coalgebraic Standard Translation for CML. The formulas CMLΛΣ of pure (coal-
gebraic) modal logic in the modal signature Λ over Σ (now all elements of Σ are assumed to
be of arity 1) are given by the grammar:
CMLΛΣ φ, ψ ::= P | ⊥ | φ→ ψ | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn),
where P ∈ Σ.
Satisfaction is defined with respect to M = (C, γ, I) and a specific point c ∈ C in a
standard way, see e.g. [SP10a, SP10b].
Definition and Proposition 4.1. Define the coalgebraic standard translation as
ST x(P ) = P (x),
ST x(♥(φ1, . . . , φn)) = x♥dx : ST x(φ1)e . . . dx : ST x(φn)e,
ST x(⊥) = ⊥,
ST x(φ→ ψ) = ST x(φ)→ ST x(ψ).
Then for any φ ∈ CMLΛΣ and any M = (C, γ, I), v, c, we have M, c  φ iff M, v[x 7→ c] 
ST x(φ).
For example, ST x(♥♥P ) = x♥dx : x♥dx : P (x)ee. This definition is more straightfor-
ward than the standard translation into FOL of modal logic over ordinary Kripke frames.
Moreover, ST x uses only one variable from iVar, namely x itself. In fact, we can immediately
observe that
Proposition 4.2. Whenever Σ consists entirely of unary predicate symbols, the subset
of φ ∈ CPL(Σ) obtained as the image of ST x for a fixed x ∈ iVar consists precisely of
equality-free and quantifier-free formulas in the variable x.
4.2. Hybrid Languages. In this section, we establish the equivalence of CPL with the
hybrid languages HΛ(↓,A) and HΛ(∀,@). Both correspondences also hold for ordinary
predicate logic over relational structures (FOL) and extend to CPL. We take this as yet
another indication that CPL is natural and well-designed both as a generalization of FOL
and “the” predicate logic cousin of existing coalgebraic formalisms.
This is our main, but not the only motivation. We progress towards this result step-by-step,
extending the modal language gradually with new hybrid constructs. In this way, we reveal
that a similar correspondence exists between natural fragments of CPL and weaker hybrid
languages, most importantly between quantifier-free CPL and HΛ(↓,@).
Again, obviously the correspondence between fragments of CPL and extensions of CML is
tighter than in the case of FOL and ML only due to the modal flavour of CPL. However,
results such as Corollary 4.5 are useful spadework: any model-theoretic tool to be developed—
say, a variant of E-F games—would be adequate for an extended coalgebraic modal formalism
(e.g., HΛ(↓,@)) iff it is adequate for the corresponding fragment of CPL (e.g., the variable-
free fragment), so we are free to work with whichever formalism we find more convenient at
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a given moment. The straightforward correspondence also provides a good starting point for
an extension of research programme sketched in [Cat05]—see Remark 4.9 at the end of this
section.
Given a supply of world variables wVar that we are going to keep fixed and implicit—in fact,
as stated below, near identical to iVar—we define the following coalgebraic hybrid languages
HΛ(↓,@) φ, ψ ::= z | P | ⊥ | φ→ ψ | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) | @zφ | ↓z.φ
HΛ(↓,A) φ, ψ ::= z | P | ⊥ | φ→ ψ | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) | Aφ | ↓z.φ
HΛ(∀,@) φ, ψ ::= z | P | ⊥ | φ→ ψ | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) | @zφ | ∀z.φ
where z ∈ wVar. We refer the reader to, e.g, [SP10b, BC06, Cat05] for the semantics. The
extension of the standard translation to these formalism is unproblematic in some cases, just
like in the case of ordinary hybrid logic over Kripke frames:
ST x(z) = x = z, ST x(Aφ) = ∀x.ST x(φ), ST x(∀z.φ) = ∀z.ST x(φ).
One is tempted to put forward also
ST x(@zφ) = ST x(φ)[z/x], ST x(↓z.φ) = ST x(φ)[x/z].
However, with other clauses remaining the same, this would violate our convention that
[z/x] is used only when z is substitutable for x; we would need to interpret it as capture-
avoiding substitution. Sadly, this in turn would entail forsaking the luxury of using just one
designated variable for comprehension. Guillame Malod (see [CF05]) observed that if we
restrict the supply of variables, a translation along the above lines—indeed first proposed
in the literature, which also goes to show that the present discussion is less trivial than it
might seem—would fail even when embedding the hybrid logic over Kripke frames in the
two-variable fragment of FOL. Malod’s counterexample used nesting of modalities of level
two, but as our translation uses just one designated variable, ST would go wrong already on
formulas of depth one. Just consider ST x(↓z.♦z): were we careless about capture of bound
variables, we would obtain x♦dx : x = xe, which is a formula with a completely different
meaning. There are two ways out. First is to redefine
STmodx(@zφ) = ∀x.(x = z → ST x(φ)), (4.1)
STmodx(↓z.φ) = ∀z.(x = z → ST x(φ)). (4.2)
The second is to keep ST for hybrid formulas as defined above and change the modal
clause instead:
ST x(♥(φ1, . . . , φn)) = x♥dy : ST y(φ1)e . . . dy : ST y(φn)e, (4.3)
where y is the first (in some fixed enumeration) variable not used in ST x(φ1), . . . ,ST x(φn);
by not used here we mean both free and bound usage. Furthermore, to ensure that the
translation works correctly, we have to assume that neither x nor y appears in wVar. While
the requirement to use more bound variables can be cumbersome—particularly for infinite
sets of formulas—we prefer this option, as it makes it easier to characterize weaker hybrid
languages as suitable syntactic fragments of CPL.
We can now state a generalization of both Proposition 4.1 and corresponding results
from the hybrid logic literature—see, e.g., [BC06] for references:
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Table 2: Coalgebraic Hybrid Translation from quantifier-free CPL to HΛ(↓,@)
HT (P (x)) = @xP HT (x = y) = @xy
HT (⊥) = ⊥ HT (φ→ ψ) = HT (φ)→ HT (ψ)
HT (x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne) = @x♥(↓y1.HT (φ1), . . . , ↓yn.HT (φn))
Proposition 4.3. For any hybrid formula φ and any M = (C, γ, I), v, c, we have M, v, c  φ
iff M, v[x 7→ c]  ST x(φ).
As is well-known in the hybrid logic community—see again [BC06] for references—there is
also a translation in the reverse direction for sufficiently expressive hybrid languages. This
also generalizes to our setting, see Table 2.
Proposition 4.4. For any φ ∈ CPL and any M = (C, γ, I), v, c, we have
M, v, c  HT (φ) iff M, v[x 7→ c]  φ.
Combining Propositions 4.4 and 4.3, we get:
Corollary 4.5. Whenever Σ consists purely of unary predicates (and no function symbols),
HΛ(↓,@) is expressively equivalent to the quantifier-free fragment of CPL, assuming iVar
contains wVar plus a disjoint infinite supply of additional individual variables (used for
comprehension).
Remark 4.6 (Quantifier-free CPL as the bounded fragment of FOL). In the case of ordinary
FOL, the fragment equivalent to HΛ(↓,@) is characterized as the bounded fragment, see, e.g.,
[AtC07]. In fact, our formula x♥dy : φe, despite being quantifier-free on the surface, can be
described as a form of bounded quantification. This can be formalized as a result stating
that over coalgebras for the covariant powerset functor (Kripke frames), quantifier-free CPL
is equivalent to the bounded-fragment of ordinary FOL, where the role of ♥ in CPL is played
by the binary relation symbol R in FOL; details are left to the reader.
Remark 4.7 (Chang’s original syntax). As already mentioned, our syntax is slightly
different to the original one proposed by Chang [Cha73]. In that paper, there were no
explicit comprehension variables and even in the enriched syntax which allowed constants
and function terms, the term on the left-hand side of ♥ had to be a variable. This variable
was reused then on the right side of ♥ as the comprehension variable. In other words,
Chang’s x♥φ(x) was equivalent to ours x♥dx : φ(x)e. In presence of quantifiers, which can
be used to simulate the effect of capture-avoiding substitution as in STmod (this trick in
fact stems back to Alfred Tarski), the two languages are obviously equivalent. But when
considering fragments, as we do here, the equivalence breaks down; without quantifiers,
Chang’s syntax does not allow (4.2) and simple renaming of the comprehension variable on
the right-hand side of ♥ as in (4.3) is not possible either.
There are two usual routes in hybrid logic to achieve full first-order expressivity. One is to
add universal quantifiers over wVar in presence of the satisfaction operator @. The other is
to add the global modality A in presence of the downarrow binder ↓. The hybrid translation
is extended then as follows:
HT ∀@(∀x.φ) = ∀x.HT (φ)
HTA↓(∀x.φ) =↓y.A ↓x.A(y → φ)
In HTA↓ we need the proviso that y is not occurring in the whole formula.
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Theorem 4.8. HΛ(↓,A), HΛ(∀,@) and CPL are expressively equivalent.
As we can use STmodx now and keep reusing x as the comprehension variable, it is enough
to assume that iVar = wVar ∪ {x}. Since @zφ is definable in presence of A (as A(z → φ)),
↓ is definable by the universal quantifier over wVar (as ∀z.(z → φ)) and A is definable by
combination of ∀ and @ (as ∀y.@yφ, where y is not used in φ), we get in fact seven equivalent
languages: CPL, Chang’s original language, HΛ(↓,A), HΛ(∀,@), HΛ(↓,A) with @, HΛ(∀,@)
with ↓ and the jumbo hybrid language with all connectives introduced above.
Remark 4.9. The equivalences stated here extend to the case of hybrid languages and
CPL enriched with quantification over predicates (i.e., second-order languages). It would be
interesting to follow more thoroughly the program of coalgebraic abstract model theory both
above and below CPL. See Ten Cate’s PhD Thesis [Cat05] for spadework in abstract model
theory below first-order logic.
4.3. Semantic Correspondence: The Van Benthem-Rosen Theorem. Our Proposi-
tion 4.2 provides a syntactic characterization of the modal fragment of our language. In a
companion paper [SPL17], we develop a semantic, Van Benthem-Rosen style characterization.
To compare these two characterizations, let us briefly recall the details.
In the context of standard Kripke models, expressiveness of modal logic is characterized
by van Benthem’s theorem: modal logic is the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order
logic in the corresponding signature. The finitary analogue of this theorem [Ros97] states
that every formula that is bisimulation invariant over finite models is equivalent over finite
models to a modal formula. In the coalgebraic context, replace bisimilarity with behavioural
equivalence [Sta11]. Moreover, we need to assume that the language has ‘enough’ expressive
power; e.g., we cannot expect that bisimulation invariant formulas are equivalent to CML
formulas over the empty similarity type. This is made precise as follows:
Definition 4.10. A Λ-structure is separating if, for every set X, every element t ∈ TX is
uniquely determined by the set {(♥, A) | ♥ ∈ Λ n-ary, A ∈ P(X)n, t ∈ J♥KX(A)}.
Separation is in general a less restrictive condition than those we needed for completeness
proofs. In particular, separation automatically obtains for Kripke semantics. It was first
used to establish the Hennessy-Milner property for coalgebraic logics [Pat04, Sch08].
Theorem 4.11 ([SPL17]). Suppose that the structure is separating and φ(x) is a CPL
formula with one free variable. Then φ is invariant under behavioural equivalence (over
finite models) iff it is equivalent to an infinitary CML formula with finite modal rank (over
finite models).
If we deal with finite similarity types only, the conclusion can be strengthened:
Theorem 4.12 ([SPL17]). Suppose that the structure is separating, Λ is finite and φ(x) is
a CPL formula with one free variable. Then φ is invariant under behavioural equivalence
(over finite models) iff φ is equivalent to a finite CML formula (over finite models).
In fact, we can combine Theorem 4.12 with the syntactic characterization of Proposition
4.2 to obtain
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Corollary 4.13. Whenever Σ consists entirely of unary predicate symbols and the structure
is separating, the behaviourally-invariant (over finite structures) formulas of CPL in one-
free variable are up to equivalence (over finite structures) precisely the equality-free and
quantifier-free formulas in the single-variable fragment of CPL.
5. First Steps in Coalgebraic Model Theory
We proceed to outline the beginning of coalgebraic model theory, taking a look at ultra-
products and the downwards Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem. In the course of the technical
development, we will import a result on one-step cutfree complete rule sets established in
earlier work [Sch07, PS10].
Recall that if U is an ultrafilter on an index set I and (Xi) is an I-indexed family of
nonempty sets, then the ultraproduct
∏
UXi is defined as∏
UXi =
(∏
i∈I Xi
)
/ ∼
where ∼ is the equivalence relation on ∏i∈I Xi defined by
(xi) ∼ (yi) ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I | xi = yi} ∈ U.
One may regard U as a {0, 1}-valued measure on I; under this reading, the above definition
says that (xi) and (yi) are identified under ∼ if they are almost everywhere equal. We
write elements of
∏
UXi and
∏
i∈I Xi just as x, omitting notation for equivalence classes
and accessing the i-th component as xi.
Observe that if X =
∏
UXi is an ultraproduct of sets and (Ai) is a family of subsets
Ai ⊆ Xi, then
A =
∏
UAi := {x | {i | xi ∈ Ai} ∈ U} (5.1)
is a well-defined subset of X (this is in fact just the way unary predicates are standardly
extended from the components to the ultraproduct). Subsets of ultraproducts that are of
this form are called admissible.
Lemma 5.1. All finite subsets of ultraproducts are admissible.
Ultraproducts of coalgebras will not be determined uniquely; instead, we give a property-
oriented definition and later show existence.
Definition 5.2 (Quasi-Ultraproducts of Coalgebras). Let (Ci) = (Xi, ξi)i∈I be a family
of T -coalgebras, and let U be an ultrafilter on I. A coalgebra ξ on the set-ultraproduct
X =
∏
UXi is called a quasi-ultraproduct of the Ci if for every family (Ai) of subsets Ai ⊆ Xi,
every x ∈∏UXi, and every ♥ ∈ Λ,
ξ(x) ∈ [[♥]]X
∏
UAi ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I | ξi(xi) ∈ J♥KCi(Ai)} ∈ U. (5.2)
The notion of quasi-ultraproduct extends naturally to coalgebraic models using the standard
definition to extend the interpretation of predicates (as indicated above, Equation (5.1)
recalls the case of unary predicates).
The definition of quasi-ultraproducts is designed in such a way that  Los´’s theorem, which
in the view of ultrafilters as {0, 1}-valued measures states that the ultraproduct satisfies
exactly those formulas that hold in almost all its components, extends to coalgebras:
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Theorem 5.3 (Coalgebraic  Los´’s Theorem). If M = (C, γ, V ) is a quasi-ultraproduct of
Mi = (Ci, γi, Vi) for the ultrafilter U, then for every tuple (a
1, . . . , an) of states in C, where
ak = (aki )i∈I , and for every CPL formula φ(x1, . . . , xn), C |= φ(a1, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ {i | Ci |=
φ(a1i , . . . , a
k
i )} ∈ U.
Proof. Induction over formulas. The cases for Boolean operators and quantifiers are as in
the classical case, and the case for modal operators is exactly by the quasi-ultraproduct
property.
From this theorem, we obtain the usual applications, in particular compactness (the latter
with literally the same proof as in the classical case). The question is, of course, when
quasi-ultraproducts exist. A core observation is
Lemma 5.4. In the notation of Definition 5.2, the demands placed on ξ(x) by Condition (5.2)
constitute a finitely satisfiable set of one-step formulas.
In the proof of this lemma, and on several further occasions, we will need the fact that
the set of all one-step sound one-step rules is one-step cutfree complete [PS10]. Instead of
repeating the definition of this term, we state the relevant property directly.
Lemma 5.5. [Sch07, Theorem 18 with proof] Let Φ be a finite subset of Λ(P(C))∪¬Λ(P(C)),
where ¬Λ(P(C)) = {¬♥A | ♥A ∈ Λ(P(C))}. If Φ is one-step unsatisfiable, then there exists
a sound one-step rule A/P and a valuation τ : sVar → P(C) such that C |= Aτ and
P τ = ¬∧Φ.
We then proceed as follows with the open proof of Lemma 5.4:
Proof (Lemma 5.4). Fix finitely many instances of (5.2) (keeping the same notation) for
families of sets (Aji )i∈I and sets A
j =
∏
UA
j
i , j = 1, . . . , k. We regard these sets as extensions
of unary predicates P j over the Xi and over X, respectively. If the corresponding instances
of (5.2) do not have a solution ξ(x) in TX, then by Lemma 5.5 we have a sound one-step
rule A/P and a valuation τ : sVar → P(X) such that X |= Aτ but the instances of (5.2)
for A1, . . . , Ak demand ξ(x) |= ¬P τ . Let p1, . . . ,pk be the schematic variables appearing in
A/P ; w.l.o.g. τ(pj) = A
j for j = 1, . . . , k. Then X satisfies the first-order sentence ∀z.(Aσ)
where σ(pj) = P
j(y). By  Los´’s theorem (in fact already by its classical version), there exists
B ∈ U such that Xi |= ∀z.(Aσ) and hence Xi |= Aτi for all i ∈ B, where τi(pj) = Aji . By
one-step soundness of A/P this implies TXi |= P τi for all i ∈ B. But our formulation above
that the instances of (5.2) for A1, . . . , Ak demand ξ(x) |= ¬P τ means more explicitly (and
using the fact that U is an ultrafilter) that {i ∈ I | ξi(xi) |= ¬P τi} ∈ U, so that we have a
contradiction.
From Lemma 5.4, our first existence criterion for quasi-ultraproducts is immediate:
Theorem 5.6. If a Λ-structure is one-step compact (Definition 3.5), then it has quasi-
ultraproducts.
Example 5.7. The above criterion applies in particular to all neighbourhood-like logics. It
thus subsumes Chang’s original ultraproduct construction [Cha73]
Like for our completeness results, an alternative is to require bounded operators:
Theorem 5.8. If a Λ-structure is finitary one-step compact (Definition 3.5) and all its
operators are bounded, then it has quasi-ultraproducts.
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The proof needs the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. Let (Ci) = (Xi, ξi)i∈I be a family of T -coalgebras, and let U be an ultrafilter
on I. Let X be the ultraproduct
∏
UXi, and let x ∈ X. Then the set
Ψ = {♥{y1, . . . , yk} | {i | ξi(xi) |= ♥{y1i , . . . , yki }} ∈ U}
of one-step formulas (where ♥ ranges over Λ, the yi range over X, and  stands for either
negation or nothing) is finitely satisfiable.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 5.4, using atoms of the form z = c in place of unary predicates.
In more detail: if a finite subset Φ of Ψ is one-step unsatisfiable, then by Lemma 5.5 there
exist a one-step sound rule A/P and a valuation τ such that P τ = ¬∧Φ and X |= Aτ . Now
X |= Aτ is semantically equivalent to X |= ∀z.A0 where A0 is propositional formula over
atoms of the form z = c, where c ranges over constants denoting elements of the involved finite
subsets of X in an extended first-order structure based on X. Then {i | Xi |= ∀z.A0} ∈ U by
(the classical version of)  Los´’s theorem, where we interpret constants in Xi by taking the i-th
component of the interpretation in X (this is just the way the interpretation of constants in
the factors relates to that in the ultraproduct, classically). Hence {i | Xi |= Aσi} ∈ U, where
σi replaces {y1, . . . , yk} with {y1i , . . . , yki }, and hence {i | TXi |= W } ∈ U, contradiction as
in Lemma 5.4.
Proof (Theorem 5.8). By Lemma 5.9 and finitary one-step compactness, there exists ξ(x)
satisfying the set Ψ from Lemma 5.9. To show 5.2 for A ⊆ X, we regard A as the extension
of a unary predicate P . Then ξ(x) |= ♥A is equivalent to
x |= ∃y1, . . . , yk. (P (y1) ∧ · · · ∧ P (yk) ∧ x♥dz : z = y1, . . . , z = yke).
Thus it suffices to prove the  Los´ equivalence for formulas x♥dz : z = y1, . . . , z = yke. This,
however, is exactly what satisfaction of Ψ by ξ(x) guarantees.
For operators that are ω-bounded but not k-bounded for any k, the ultraproduct construction
cannot be available, in consequence of Theorem 3.37. However, the downward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem theorem does survive under the weaker assumption of ω-boundedness:
Theorem 5.10 (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem). Over ω-bounded finitary one-step
compact Λ-structures, CPL(Λ,Σ) satisfies the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem; that
is, every model of infinite cardinality κ has, for every infinite cardinal λ ≤ κ, an elementary
substructure of cardinality λ.
Here, we use the term elementary substructure in the usual way to designate first-order
substructures whose elements satisfy the same formulas as they do in the original model;
we explicitly do not require that the coalgebra structure on the substructure forms a
subcoalgebra.
The proof needs the following simple lemma.
Lemma 5.11. Let Y be an infinite subset of X, τ : sVar → Pfin(Y ) and A ∈ Prop(sVar).
Then Y |= Aτ iff X |= Aτ .
Proof. Only finitely many p ∈ sVar are relevant, so we can, for the rest of the proof, assume
that sVar is finite. Define the τ -valuation of x ∈ X as the valuation κ : sVar → 2 given
by κ(p) = > iff x ∈ τ(p). Then the claim of the lemma is equivalent to saying that every
τ -valuation occurring in X occurs also in Y . Now if x ∈ X \ Y , then the τ -valuation of x is
everywhere false; this valuation occurs also in Y , as sVar and the τ(p) are finite.
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Proof (Theorem 5.10). Let M = (C, γ, I) be a coalgebraic model of cardinality κ. Pick
Skolem functions for all formulas ∃x. φ as usual, and for every formula x♥dy : φe a finitely
non-deterministic Skolem function fx♥dy:φe : CFV(x♥dy:φe) → Pfin(C) with the property that
for every valuation η ∈ CFV(x♥dy:φe), fx♥dy:φe(η) ⊆fin [[φ]]C,η and
C, η |= x♥dy : φe ⇐⇒ γ(η(x)) |= ♥fx♥dy:φe(η).
(Such a function fx♥dy:φe exists because ♥ is ω-bounded.) Pick a countably infinite subset
Y0 ⊆ C and let Y be the closure of Y0 under the Skolem functions, in the case of the
non-deterministic Skolem functions fx♥dy:φe in the sense that fx♥dy:φe[Y ] ⊆ Y . Then Y is
countable: it consists of the possible values of countably many finitely non-deterministic
finite Skolem terms.
It remains to define a coalgebra structure ζ on c ∈ Y in such a way that
ζ(c) |= ♥A ⇐⇒ γ(c) |= ♥A (5.3)
for all A ⊆fin Y ; that is, we have to prove that the set
Ψ = {♥A | γ(c) |= ♥A}
of one-step formulas over Pfin(Y ) is satisfiable over Y (where ♥ ranges over Λ, A ranges
over Pfin(Y ), and  ranges over {·,¬}). By finitary one-step compactness, it suffices to prove
that Ψ is finitely satisfiable. Assume the contrary; then by Lemma 5.5 there exists a sound
one-step rule A/P valuation τ : sVar → P(Y ) such that Y |= Aτ and P τ propositionally
contradicts some finite subset Ψ0 of Ψ. By Lemma 5.11, C |= Aτ , and hence C |= P τ ;
therefore, Ψ0 is unsatisfiable over C, in contradiction to the fact that γ(c) satisfies Ψ by
construction.
Since Ψ is satisfiable, we have a coalgebra structure ζ satisfying (5.3). It follows by
induction over the formula structure that for every coalgebraic first-order formula φ and
every valuation v in Y ,
N, v |= φ iff M, v |= φ :
where N = (Y, ζ, J) and J is the induced substructure obtained by restricting I to Y . The
Boolean cases are trivial. The case for existential quantification is as in the classical case.
The case x♥dy : φe is as follows: N, v |= x♥dy : φe iff ζ(v(x)) |= ♥[[φ]]N,v = ♥([[φ]]M,v ∩ Y )
(where the equality holds by induction) iff (by ω-boundedness) ζ(v(x)) |= ♥A for some A ⊆fin
[[φ]]M,v ∩ Y , equivalently γ(v(x)) |= ♥A by (5.3). The latter implies M, v |= x♥dy : φe by
monotonicity; conversely, M, v |= x♥dy : φe implies γ(v(x)) |= ♥fx♥dy:φe(v) by construction,
and fx♥dy:φe(v) ⊆fin [[φ]]M,v ∩ Y .
Example 5.12. The above version of the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem applies
to our main bounded examples (relational, graded, and positive Presburger modalities) as
well as to probabilistic modalities over non-standard or zerodimensional subdistributions,
respectively, which are ω-bounded but not k-bounded for any k (Examples 3.35 and 3.36).
Finally, we note that the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem holds also for the one-step
compact case; this is in mild generalization of a corresponding result for the neighbourhood
case proved already by Chang [Cha73].
Theorem 5.13. Over one-step compact Λ-structures, CPL(Λ,Σ) satisfies the downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem (in the same formulation as in Theorem 5.10).
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Proof. Let Φ be a set of coalgebraic first-order formulas in CPL(Λ,Σ), and let M = (C, γ, I)
be such that M |= Φ. Pick Skolem functions for all formulas ∃x. φ as usual, and for every
one-step sound one-step rule R = A/P fix a Skolem function that given an element x ∈ C
satisfying some instance of ¬P picks an element of C that satisfies the corresponding instance
of ¬A. More precisely: let σ : iVar → CPL(Λ,Σ) be a substitution, let x, y be variables
with x fresh, let P x,yσ be the formula obtained by replacing in P each modal operator
application ♥p with x♥dy : σ(p)e, and let v be a valuation such that M, v |= ¬P x,yσ. Then
there exists a y-variant v′ of v such that M, v′ |= ¬Aσ, and the Skolem function fR,σ assigns
such a v′(y) to v|FV(P x,yσ). As FV(P x,yσ) is finite, fR,σ is a finitary function, so that closing
a given subset Y0 ⊆ C of cardinality |Y0| = λ under the Skolem functions yields a set Y ⊆ C
of the same cardinality |Y | = λ.
The coalgebra structure ζ that we are to define on Y has to satisfy the coherence
condition
ζ(c) |= ♥([[ρ]]yv ∩ Y ) iff γ(c) |= ♥[[ρ]]yv
for all c ∈ Y , all formulas ρ, and all valuations v in Y , where the second condition is by
definition equivalent to c ∈ [[x♥dy : ρe]]xv . Once this is established, we can show as usual that
N = (Y, ζ, J), with J interpreting Σ by restricting I to Y , is an elementary substructure of
(C, γ, I), and we are done.
Now assume that ζ(c) as required fails to exist, which means that the set Φ of constraints
of the form ♥([[ρ]]yv ∩ Y ) (where  stands for either nothing or negation) on ζ(c) determined
by the coherence condition is one-step unsatisfiable. By one-step compactness, already
some finite subset Φ0 of Φ is unsatisfiable. By Lemma 5.5 and the format of Φ, there
exist a sound one-step rule R = A/P and a substitution σ : sVar → CPL(Λ,Σ) such
that Y |= Aτ and P τ = ¬∧Φ0 where τ(p) = [[σ(p)]]yv ∩ Y . However, by construction
of Φ we have γ(c) ∈ [[¬P ]]τˆ , where τˆ is the P(C)-valuation sending p ∈ sVar to [[σ(p)]]yv,
and hence M, v |= ¬P x,yσ where x is fresh and we assume w.l.o.g. that v(x) = c. Then
fR,σ(v|FV(P x,yσ)) ∈ [[¬A]]τ , in contradiction to Y |= Aτ .
Example 5.14. Besides the plain neighbourhood case, Theorem 5.13 covers all instances of
CPL defined by imposing rank-1 frame conditions on neighbourhood frames, e.g. CPL over
monotone neighbourhood frames and various deontic logics.
6. Proof theory
6.1. Sequent system for CPL. In § 3, we have seen a complete Hilbert calculus for
coalgebraic predicate logic. The present goal is a cut-free, complete sequent calculus. Our
basis is the system G1c of [TS96] that we extend with modal rules describing the (fixed)
Λ-structure. Our treatment of equality, on the other hand, is inspired by Kanger [Kan57],
Degtyarev and Voronkov [DV01] and Seligman [Sel01]. In fact, the syntactic cut-elimination
proof presented here is based on Seligman’s ideas.
We take sequents to be pairs (Γ,∆), written Γ⇒ ∆ where Γ,∆ ⊆ L are finite multisets.
The sequent calculus for coalgebraic predicate logic contains four types of rules: the standard
logical and structural rules for first-order logic, rules for equality and rules for the modal
operators. The logical rules are standard as in Table 3. The formula introduced in the
conclusion of a logical rule is called the principal formula of the rule. This applies, in
particular, to the structural rules in Table 3: the formula φ in the conclusion is the principal
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one. Note that, somewhat counterintuitively, in the equality rules the formula x = y in the
conclusion is the context, i.e., the only non-principal formula and all the remaining ones are
principal !
To account for the modal operators, we incorporate the one-step rules R into the sequent
system. In principle, we just generate a sequent rule within CPL from every one-step rule
in R. Only for presentational purposes, we factor this process through an alternative modal
rule format where propositional operators are fully dissolved into sequents:
Definition 6.1. A rule
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 · · ·Γk ⇒ ∆k
♥1~p1, . . . ,♥n~pn ⇒ ♥n+1~pn+1, . . . ,♥n+m~pn+m
represents a one-step rule A/P in sequent format if A is propositionally equivalent to∧k
i=1((
∧
Γi)→ (
∨
∆i), and P is propositionally equivalent to (
∧n
j=1♥j~pj)→ (
∨m
j=n+1♥j~pj).
We transfer the existing syntactic restrictions on one-step rules according to Definition 3.2
to this format by requiring that every schematic variable occurring in the premise occurs
also in the conclusion, and every schematic variable occurs at most once in the conclusion.
It is clear that every one-step rule can be represented in sequent format (just transform the
premise into conjunctive normal form and then trivially translate disjunctive clauses into
sequents in both premise and conclusion). Subsequently, we generate a sequent rule S(R) in
CPL syntax, adding weakening contexts Σ, Θ to both the conclusion and all the premises:
Σ,Γ1σ
y
x ⇒ ∆1σyx,Θ · · · Σ,Γkσyx ⇒ ∆kσyx,Θ
Σ, z♥1dx1 :φ1e, . . . , z♥ndxn :φne⇒ z♥n+1dxn+1 :φn+1e, . . . , z♥n+mdxn+m :φn+me,Θ
with syntactic details as summarized in Table 3. The formulas z♥idx :φie are the principal
formulas of S(R).
Example 6.2. Recall from Example 3.8 that the rule set for the normal modal logic K
consists of rules that are represented in sequent format as
p⇒ q1, . . . , qn
♦p⇒ ♦q1, . . . ,♦qn Kn
for all n > 0. We obtain the following first-order version
Σ, φ0[y/x0]⇒ φ1[y/x1], . . . , φn[y/xn],Θ
Σ, z♦dx0 :φ0e ⇒ z♦dx1 :φ1e, . . . , z♦dxn :φne,Θ
S(Kn)†y
(where y is fresh in the conclusion) by the previous definition. Recall also that modal
neighbourhood semantics is axiomatised by a one-step rule that is represented in sequent
format as
p⇒ q q ⇒ p
p⇒ q C,
which expresses that  is a congruential operator. The first order version of C then reads
Σ, φ0[y/x0]⇒ φ1[y/x1],Θ Σ, φ1[y/x1]⇒ φ0[y/x0],Θ
Σ, zdx0 :φ0e ⇒ zdx1 :φ1e,Θ
S(C)†y
(where y is fresh in the conclusion) which provides a complete and, as we are going to see
below, cut-free axiomatisation of Chang’s original logic.
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Table 3: Sequent System of Coalgebraic Predicate Logic
In all the rules below, †y means that y is fresh in the conclusion.
Axioms
φ⇒ φ Ax ⊥ ⇒ L⊥ ⇒ x = x R =
Logical Rules
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ R→
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆ L→
Γ⇒ ∆, φ[y/x]
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.φ R∀†y
φ[z/x],Γ⇒ ∆
∀x.φ,Γ⇒ ∆ L∀
Equality Rules
x = y,Γ[x/z]⇒ ∆[x/z]
x = y,Γ[y/z]⇒ ∆[y/z] L =1
x = y,Γ[y/z]⇒ ∆[y/z]
x = y,Γ[x/z]⇒ ∆[x/z] L =2
Modal Rules S(R): for every one-step rule R ∈ R,
Σ,Γ1σ
y
x ⇒ ∆1σyx,Θ · · · Σ,Γkσyx ⇒ ∆kσyx,Θ
Σ, z♥1dx1 :φ1e, . . . , z♥ndxn :φne⇒
z♥n+1dxn+1 :φn+1e, . . . , z♥n+mdxn+m :φn+me,Θ
S(R)†y
where
• R is represented in sequent format as Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 · · · Γk ⇒ ∆k♥1~p1, . . . ,♥n~pn ⇒ ♥n+1~pn+1, . . . ,♥n+m~pn+m
• dxi :φie = dx1i :φ1i e . . . dxar♥i :φar♥i e is a finite sequence of comprehension formulas according to
ar♥i, and
• the substitution σyx sends pji to the formula φji [y/xji ] of L.
Structural Rules
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ RW
Γ⇒ ∆
φ,Γ⇒ ∆ LW
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ RC
φ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆
φ,Γ⇒ ∆ LC
Cut Rule (optional)
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Cut
We write SR ` Γ⇒ ∆ if Γ⇒ ∆ can be derived using the logical rules, equality rules, and
axiom rules of Table 3, together with the rules S(R) from Table 3 for every rule R ∈ R.We
write SRCut ` Γ⇒ ∆ if the cut rule Cut of Table 3 is used additionally. If M = (C, γ, I) is
a first-order model over a Λ-structure, we write M, v |= Γ⇒ ∆ if M, v |= ∧Γ→ ∨∆ and,
as usual M |= Γ⇒ ∆ if M, v |= Γ⇒ ∆ for all variable assignments v and finally |= Γ⇒ ∆
if M |= Γ⇒ ∆ for all first-order models M over the corresponding structure, which we elide
in the notation.
Proposition 6.3. For any one-step rule R ∈ R and any model M = (C, γ, I), S(R)
preserves the validity on M.
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Proof. Let R ∈ R be represented in sequent format as
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 · · · Γk ⇒ ∆k
♥1~p1, . . . ,♥n~pn ⇒ ♥n+1~pn+1, . . . ,♥n+m~pn+m .
By Assumption 3.3, R is one-step sound. Let M = (C, γ, I) be a model. To show that S(R)
preserves validity, assume that all of Σ,Γiσ
y
x ⇒ ∆iσyx,Θ (1 6 i 6 k) are valid in M. Fix any
variable assignment v on C. To show that the conclusion of S(R) is true at M, v, assume
that M,v |= ∧Σ and M, v 6|= ∨Θ. Our goal is to show that
M, v |=
∧
16i6n
z♥idxi :φie→
∨
16j6m
z♥n+jdxn+j :φn+je,
i.e.,
if γ(v(z)) ∈ ⋂16i6nJ♥iKC,v(Jφ1i Kx1iC,v, . . . , Jφar♥ii Kxar♥iiC,v )
then γ(v(z)) ∈ ⋃16j6mJ♥n+jKC,v(Jφ1n+jKx1n+jC,v , . . . , Jφar♥n+jn+j Kxar♥n+jn+jC,v ) .
Let us define a valuation τ : sVar → P(C) by τ(pji ) = Jφji [y/xji ]KyC,v. To show that
C, τ |= ∧Γi → ∨∆i for all 1 6 i 6 k, let us fix any c ∈ C. Since y is fresh in the
conclusion of S(R), it follows from M,v |= ∧Σ and M,v 6|= ∨Θ that M, v[c/y] |= ∧Σ and
M,v[c/y] 6|= ∨Θ. Then from our assumption of the validity of all premises of S(R) on a
pair (M,v), we obtain M,v[c/y] |= Γiσyx ⇒ ∆iσyx, which implies c ∈ τ(
∧
Γi →
∨
∆i), as
desired. Since R is one-step sound, we have that TC, τ |= ∧16i6n♥i~pi → ∨16j6m♥n+j~pn+j .
Because τ(pji ) = Jφji [y/xji ]KyC,v = Jφji KxjiC,v by freshness of y, we can conclude our desired
implication above.
We show soundness and completeness of the sequent system SR by translating into, and
from, the Hilbert system HR which is known to be (semantically) complete when R is
strongly one-step complete. Note that HR does not include the the BdPL[Λ-axioms. Before
showing that both systems HR and SRCut have the same deductive power, we note one
consequence of the congruence rule (Remark 3.7) provided that the rules absorb congruence.
We introduce the concept of absorption in a slightly more general form which will be used
later.
Definition 6.4. We say that a finite set S of sequents covers a finite set S′ of sequents
if each element Γ ⇒ ∆ of S′ contains some element Π ⇒ Σ of S in the sense that Π ⊆ Γ
and Σ ⊆ ∆. We write SB S′ if S covers S′ where we identify sequents with singleton sets.
A set R of rules absorbs a rule Σ1 ⇒ Θ1, · · · ,Σm ⇒ Θm/Σ ⇒ Θ if there exists a rule
R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γn ⇒ ∆n/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R such that
{Σ1 ⇒ Θ1, . . . ,Σm ⇒ Θm}B {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γn ⇒ ∆n}
and ΓR ⇒ ∆R B Σ⇒ Θ. A rule set absorbs congruence if it absorbs the rule
p1 ⇒ q1 · · · pn ⇒ qn q1 ⇒ p1 · · · qn ⇒ pn
♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn) Cong♥
and it absorbs monotonicity of ♥ in the i-th argument if the rule
pi ⇒ qi
♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(p1, . . . , pi−1, qi, pi+1, . . . pn) Moni
is absorbed.
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Lemma 6.5. When R absorbs congruence, the following congruence rule
{Σ, φj0[y/xj0]⇒ φj1[y/xj1],Θ Σ, φj1[y/xj1]⇒ φj0[y/xj0],Θ | 1 6 j 6 n}
Σ, z♥dx0 : φ0e⇒ z♥dx1 : φ1e,Θ Cong♥
(where y is fresh in the conclusion and n is the arity of ♥) is admissible in SR and SRCut.
Proof. Since R absorbs congruence, we can find a one-step rule R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γm ⇒
∆m/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R such that {pj ⇒ qj , qj ⇒ pj | 1 6 j 6 n} B {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γm ⇒ ∆m}
and ΓR ⇒ ∆R B ♥(p1, . . . , pn) ⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn). Fix such a one-step rule R. Assume
that Σ, φj0[y/x
j
0] ⇒ φj1[y/xj1],Θ and Σ, φj1[y/xj1] ⇒ φj0[y/xj0],Θ are derivable in SR for all
1 6 j 6 n. Let us define the substitution σyx which sends each pji to a formula φ
j
i [y/x
j
i ],
where i = 0 or 1. Since {pj ⇒ qj , qj ⇒ pj | 1 6 j 6 n} B {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γm ⇒ ∆m}, we
can obtain the derivability of Σ,Γkσ
y
x ⇒ ∆kσyx,Θ (1 6 k 6 m) in SR with the help of
weakening rules. Since R ∈ R, the covering ΓR ⇒ ∆R B♥(p1, . . . , pn)⇒ ♥(q1, . . . , qn) and
the weakening rules allow us to obtain the derivability of Σ, z♥dx0 : φ0e⇒ z♥dx1 : φ1e,Θ
in SR, as required.
By our equality rules, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 6.6. The replacement axiom x = y, φ[x/z]⇒ φ[y/z] is derivable in SR.
One direction of the translation between the two proof systems can now be given as follows:
Theorem 6.7. Suppose that R absorbs congruence and let HR ` φ. Then SRCut `⇒ φ.
Proof. First, we demonstrate admissibility of modus ponens in SRCut by
⇒ φ
⇒ φ→ ψ φ→ ψ, φ⇒ ψ
φ⇒ ψ Cut
⇒ ψ Cut
where the derivability of φ→ ψ, φ⇒ ψ is easily established by L→. Note that this is the
only place in this proof where we need Cut. Hence, it suffices to show that all the axioms
of HR (recall Table 3) are derivable in cut-free SR. All of equality axioms En5, En6.1
and En6.2 are derivable by the equality axiom R = and the equality rules L =i. Moreover,
since this is easy to show for logical but non-modal axioms, we focus on Cong, Alpha
and Onestep(R). Firstly, the derivability of Cong follows from Lemma 6.5. Secondly, for
Alpha we have the following derivation:
{φj [y/xj ]⇒ φj [y/xj ] | j 6= i} φi[y/xi]⇒ φi[u/xi][y/u] φi[u/xi][y/u]⇒ φi[y/xi]
z♥dx0 : φ0e · · · dxi : φie · · · dxn : φne ⇒ z♥dx0 : φ0e · · · du : φi[u/xi]e · · · dxn : φne Cong♥
where we note that Cong♥ is admissible by Lemma 6.5. All the premises are axioms since
u is assumed to be fresh in φi. Finally, let us move to the provability of Onestep(R).
Suppose that R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γk ⇒ ∆k/ΓR ⇒ ∆R is a one-step rule as in Definition 3.2.
With the help of contraction rules, we note that the following are derivable rules in SR: for
any finite multiset Θ,
Θ,Γ⇒ ∆∧
Θ,Γ⇒ ∆ L∧
Γ⇒ ∆,Θ
Γ⇒ ∆,∨Θ R∨.
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We obtain the following derivation where N = {1, ..., n}, M = {n+ 1, ..., n+m} and pii is
an abbreviation of (
∧
Γi →
∨
∆i)σ:
{pi1[y/x] ∧ · · · ∧ pin[y/x], (Γiσ)[y/x]⇒ (∆iσ)[y/x] | 1 6 i 6 k}
{∀x.(pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ pin), (Γiσ)[y/x]⇒ (∆iσ)[y/x] | 1 6 i 6 k} L∀
∀x.(pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ pin), {x♥idx : φie | i ∈ N} ⇒ {x♥idx : φie | i ∈M} S(R)
∀x.(pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ pin),
∧{x♥idx : φie | i ∈ N} ⇒ ∨{x♥idx : φie | i ∈M} L∧,R∧
which shows derivability of the axiom Onestep(R) as the top sequent is readily seen to be
derivable in SR.
For the converse direction, absorption of congruence is not required.
Theorem 6.8. Suppose that SRCut ` Γ⇒ ∆. Then HR ` ∧Γ→ ∨∆.
Proof. It suffices to show that all the translations of the axioms and rules of SR are derivable
in HR. We can easily handle the cases of the axioms and rules for logical connectives of
first-order logic. The provability of the translation of L =i follows from the provability of
x = y → (φ[x/w]→ φ[y/w]). As for ♥ ∈ Λ, the provability of the translation of S(R) follows
from Onestep(R) and Alpha.
As a corollary, we obtain (for the time being, in a calculus with cut) both soundness and
completeness of the sequent calculus.
Corollary 6.9. Suppose that R is strongly one-step complete. Then SRCut ` Γ⇒ ∆ iff
|= Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. By Theorems 6.7 and 6.8 in conjunction with soundness and completeness of HR
(Theorem 3.19). The absorption of congruence was shown in [PS10, Proposition 5.12].
A paradigmatic example of a set of rules satisfying the assumptions of Corollary 6.9 is C
and its CPL translation S(C) from Example 6.2 above.
As we have seen in § 3, the assumption of strongly one-step complete rule sets limits
available examples to “essentially neighbourhood-like” ones. This is why we also gave a
complete Hilbert-style axiomatisation also for bounded operators (recall Definition 3.12).
Note that k-boundedness of i-th argument of Definition 3.12 implies in particular that ♥
is monotonic in the i-th argument. Examples of bounded modalities include the standard ♦
of relational modal logic interpreted over Kripke frames, graded modalities over multigraphs
and we refer to [SP10b] for more examples. In the Hilbert-calculus, boundedness was
reflected syntactically by the axiom
BdPLk,i ∀~y.(x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyn : φne ↔ ∃z1 . . . zk.(x♥dy1 : φ1e . . . dyi−1 : φi−1e
dyi : yi = z1 ∨ · · · ∨ yi = zkedyi+1 : φi+1e . . . dyn : φne ∧
∧
j6k
φi[yi/zj ]))
where each zi is fresh for all the yis and φis. The derivability predicate induced by extending
the Hilbert calculus HR by the boundedness axiom above gives completeness under weaker
conditions.
Definition 6.10. We write BHR ` φ if φ is derivable in HR where additionally BdPLk,i
is used for every operator that is k-bounded in the i-th argument.
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Strictly speaking, the derivability predicate BHR should include information about precisely
which operators are assumed to be k-bounded in the i-th argument, but this will always be
clear from the context. In the presence of boundedness, completeness of the Hilbert-calculus
has been established under weaker conditions (see Theorem 3.19).
We can reflect boundedness in the sequent calculus by adding a paste rule, similar in spirit
to the paste rule of hybrid logic [BdRV01, § 7] which was generalised to a coalgebraic setting
in [SP10b]. In a sequent setting, this rule takes the form
Γ, x♥dx1 :φ1e · · · dxi−1 :φi−1edy :
∨
16j6k
y = zjedxi+1 :φi+1e · · · dxn :φne,
φ[z1/y], ..., φ[zk/y]⇒ ∆ z1, . . . , zk fresh
Γ, x♥dx1 :φ1e · · · dxi−1 :φi−1edy : φedxi+1 :φi+1e · · · dxn :φne ⇒ ∆
Pasteki,
where z1, ..., zk are pairwise distinct fresh variables. Additional use of the above paste-rule
in the system SR is denoted by BSR, that is, we write BSR ` Γ⇒ ∆ if Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable
in SR where Pasteki may additionally be applied for every modality that is k-bounded in
the i-th argument.
When R absorbs congruence and monotonicity of all operators that are k-bounded in
the i-th argument, we note that Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6 hold also for BSR.
Theorem 6.11. Suppose that R absorbs congruence and monotonicity in the i-th argument
of every operator that is k-bounded in the i-th argument. Then BHR ` φ implies that
BSRCut `⇒ φ.
Proof. First of all, if R absorbs monotonicity in the i-th argument of ♥ ∈ Λ, the rule
Σ, φi[y/xi]⇒ ψ[y/x],Θ
Σ, z♥dx : φe⇒ z♥dx1 : φ1e . . . dxi−1 : φi−1edxi : ψedxi+1 : φi+1e . . . dxn : φne,Θ Moni
(where y is fresh in the conclusion) is admissible in BSR (and BSRCut). Almost all the
arguments are the same as the proof of Theorem 6.7, except that we need to show the
provability of BdPL by Paste (note that the only place we need the cut rule is the derivability
of Modus Ponens). More precisely, we can show the left-to-right implication of BdPL by
means of Pasteki and Moni gives the reverse direction. For example, when ♥ is unary and
1-bounded, the derivability of the right-to-left direction of BdPL is demonstrated as follows.
v = w, φ[w/y]⇒ φ[v/y]
x♥dy : y = we, φ[w/y]⇒ x♥dy : φe Mon
x♥dy : y = we ∧ φ[w/y])⇒ x♥dy : φe L∧
∃z.(x♥dy : y = ze ∧ φ[z/y])⇒ x♥dy : φe L∃,
where the top sequent is the replacement axiom, which is derivable by Lemma 6.6.
The reverse direction of Theorem 6.11 is established analogously to Theorem 6.8 and again
absorption properties are not needed.
Theorem 6.12. BSRCut ` Γ⇒ ∆ only if BHR ` ∧Γ→ ∨∆.
Proof. The only difference from the proof of Theorem 6.7 is to need to care about the
translation of Paste. However, we can easily establish this by the axiom BDLP.
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As in the non-bounded case we obtain semantic soundness and completeness, but under
weaker coherence conditions.
Corollary 6.13. Suppose that R is strongly finitary one-step complete. Then BSRCut `
Γ⇒ ∆ iff |= Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. By Theorems 6.11 and 6.12 in conjunction with soundness and completeness of BHR
(Theorem 3.19). Note that absorption of congruence and monotonicity follows from (strong,
finitary) one-step completeness as in [PS10, Proposition 5.12].
A canonical example of a rule set satisfying the assumptions of the above corollary can be
obtained by taking K of Example 6.2 and extending it with Pasteki for i = k = n = 1.
6.2. Admissibility of Cut. When we try to prove the admissibility of Cut in first-order
logic (or SR), we encounter difficulties with the rules of contraction. That is, the following
derivation:
D =
D′
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ RC
D′′
φ,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Cut,
may be transformed into:
D′
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ
D′′
φ,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ, φ Cut
D′′
φ,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ,Θ Cut
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ LC,RC ,
but this derivation does not provide us with a reduction in terms of the number of sequents
above the application of Cut in D. This is why Gentzen introduced the following generalized
form of Cut:
Γ⇒ ∆, φm φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut
where n, m > 1 and φk stands for k copies of φ and “Mcut” is a shorthand of “multi-cut”
(sometimes also called “mix”). Since Cut is a special case of the new rule of Mcut, it suffices
for us to prove the admissibility of Mcut in a given sequent system to obtain the admissibility
of Cut in the system.
Moreover, we note that a priori we cannot expect that an application of Mcut between
two instances of modal rules can be moved up without changing the conclusion: the set R of
one-step rules can possibly consist of a single rule, and an application of Mcut between this
rule and itself may not be derivable. We therefore need to impose an additional requirement
to deal with this case.
Definition 6.14. Let S be a finite set of sequents. The set of all sequents that can be
derived from premises in S using (only) one application of Mcut is denoted by MCut(S). A
rule set R absorbs multicut, if for all pairs (R1, R2) of rules in R:
Γ11 ⇒ ∆11 · · · Γ1r1 ⇒ ∆1r1
ΓR1 ⇒ ∆R1 , (♥~p )m
R1
Γ21 ⇒ ∆21 · · · Γ2r2 ⇒ ∆2r2
(♥~p )n,ΓR2 ⇒ ∆R2
R2
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there is a rule R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γk ⇒ ∆k/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R such that:
MCut(Γ11 ⇒ ∆11, . . . ,Γ1r1 ⇒ ∆1r1 ,Γ21 ⇒ ∆21, . . . ,Γ2r2 ⇒ ∆2r2)B{Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γk ⇒ ∆k}
and ΓR ⇒ ∆R B ΓR1 ,ΓR2 ⇒ ∆R1 ,∆R2 .
Lemma 6.15. If SR ` Γ ⇒ ∆ and y is fresh in Γ and ∆, then SR ` Γ[y/x] ⇒ ∆[y/x]
with the same height of derivation.
Lemma 6.16 (Hauptsatz). Let D be a derivation in the system SR extended with Mcut in
the following form:
DL
Γ⇒ ∆, φm
DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut,
where DL and DR contain no application of Mcut, the last rule of D is the only application
of Mcut in D. Then Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ is derivable in SR.
Proof. First of all, we introduce some terminology used only in this proof. Let D be the
derivation in question. We say that φ is a cut formula of D, and we define the complexity
c(D) as the complexity of the cut formula φ, i.e., the length or the number of connectives
including the logical and modal connectives. Moreover, we define w(D) as the total number
of sequents in DL and DR. Our proof of the statement of the claim is shown by the double
induction on (c(D), w(D)) (note that c(D) > 0 and w(D) > 2). Let us denote the last applied
rule (or axiom, possibly) of a derivation E by rule(E). We divide our argument into the
following (exhaustive) cases:
(1) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is an axiom.
(2) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is a structural rule.
(3) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is a logical rule or a modal rule and the cut formula is
not principal in the rule.
(4) Both rule(DL) and rule(DR) are logical rules for the same logical connective and the
cut formula is principal in each of the rules.
(5) Both rule(DL) and rule(DR) are modal rules and the cut formula is principal in each
of the rules.
(6) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is an equality rule.
Let us check each case one by one.
(1) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is an axiom: We have four cases since it is impossible
that rule(DL) is L⊥ or rule(DL) is R =. Firstly, when rule(DL) is Ax, let the derivation
be
φ⇒ φ Ax
DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
φ,Σ⇒ Θ Mcut.
When n = 1, we already obtain the derivability of φ,Σ ⇒ Θ in SR. When n > 2,
φ,Σ⇒ Θ is obtained from φn,Σ⇒ Θ by finitely many applications of LC.
Secondly, when rule(DR) is Ax, the argument is similar to the previous case where
rule(DL) is Ax.
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Thirdly, when rule(DL) is R =, we need to look at what the last rule rule(DR) is,
where D is of the following form:
⇒ x = x R =
DR
(x = x)n,Σ⇒ Θ
Σ⇒ Θ Mcut.
If rule(DR) is an axiom, then it should be Ax and we have already checked this case in
our second case of this item. Otherwise, rule(DR) is a structural rule, a logical rule, a
modal rule or an equality rule. These cases will be discussed below (especially (2), (3)
and (6)), so we leave them out for now. It is, however, noted that the cut formula x = x
is not principal in the case (3).
Fourthly, when rule(DR) is L⊥, then we need to look at the last rule rule(DL), where
D is
DL
Γ⇒ ∆,⊥m ⊥ ⇒ L⊥
Γ⇒ ∆ Mcut.
If rule(DL) is an axiom, it should be Ax and we have already checked such case in the
first case of this item. Otherwise, rule(DL) must be a structural rule, a logical rule, an
modal rule or an equality rule. Again these cases will be discussed below (especially (2),
(3) and (6), where it is noted that the cut formula ⊥ is not principal in the case (3)), so
we leave them out for now.
(2) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is a structural rule: all arguments for this case are
standard, so we deal only with the case where rule(DL) is RC, i.e., D is of the following
form:
D′L
Γ⇒ Θ, φm+1
Γ⇒ ∆, φm RC
DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut,
since multicut plays an essential role. This derivation is transformed into:
D′L
Γ⇒ ∆, φm+1
DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut
where the application of Mcut is eliminable since the complexity of the derivation is the
same as c(D) and the weight of the derivation is smaller than w(D).
(3) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is a logical rule or a modal rule and the cut formula is
not principal in the rule: Our argument for logical rules are standard, so we focus on
the case where one of the rules is a modal rule S(R). Let rule(DL) is S(R). Then our
derivation D is of the following form:
DL1
Σ′, (Γ1σ)[y/x]⇒ (∆1σ)[y/x],Θ′, φm · · ·
DLk
Σ′, (Γkσ)[y/x]⇒ (∆kσ)[y/x],Θ′, φm
Σ′, z♥1dx :φ1e, . . . , z♥ndx :φne⇒
z♥n+1dx :φn+1e, . . . , z♥n+mdx :φn+me,Θ′, φm
S(R)†y DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Σ,Σ′, z♥1dx :φ1e, . . . , z♥ndx :φne⇒
z♥n+1dx :φn+1e, . . . , z♥n+mdx :φn+me,Θ′,Θ
Mcut
where †y in the application of S(R) means that y is fresh in the conclusion. For each
DLi , we apply height-preserving substitution [z/y] for a fresh variable z in the conclusion
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of D and we obtain the following derivation:
DLi [z/y]
Σ′, (Γiσ)[z/x]⇒ (∆iσ)[z/x],Θ′, φm
DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
Σ,Σ′, (Γiσ)[z/x]⇒ (∆iσ)[z/x],Θ′,Θ Mcut.
We can eliminate the last application of Mcut since the complexity of the derivation
is the same as c(D) and the weight of the derivation is smaller than w(D). Finally we
apply the same rule S(R) to obtain the desired conclusion. When rule(DR) be S(R),
the argument is similar to the case just discussed.
(4) Both rule(DL) and rule(DR) are logical rules for the same logical connective and the
cut formula is principal in each of the rules: We have two cases, i.e., two cases where the
cut formula is of the form φ→ ψ or of the form ∀x.φ. Here we only deal with the case
where the cut formula is of the form ∀x.φ. Then the derivation D is of the following
form:
D′L
Γ⇒ ∆, (∀x.φ)m−1, φ[y/x]
Γ⇒ ∆, (∀x.φ)m R∀†y
D′R
φ[z/x], (∀x.φ)n−1,Σ⇒ Θ
(∀x.φ)n,Σ⇒ Θ L∀
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut .
With the help of our height-preserving substitution, we can consider a multicut between
D′L and DR:
D′L[z/y]
Γ⇒ ∆, (∀x.φ)m−1, φ[z/x]
DR
(∀x.φ)n,Σ⇒ Θ
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ, φ[z/x] Mcut,
and then by induction hypothesis (the complexity of this derivation is the same as D
but the weight is smaller than the original D) we now know that Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ, φ[z/x] is
derivable in SR without multicuts by a derivation E1. Let us also consider a multicut
between DL and D′R:
DL
Γ⇒ ∆, (∀x.φ)m
D′R
φ[z/x], (∀x.φ)n−1,Σ⇒ Θ
φ[z/x],Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut,
and then by induction hypothesis (the complexity of this derivation is the same as D
but the weight is smaller than the original D) we now know that φ[z/x],Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ is
derivable in SR without multicuts by a derivation E2. Now let us take a cut between E1
and E2:
E1
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ, φ[z/x]
E2
φ[z/x],Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ
Γ,Γ,Σ,Σ⇒ ∆,∆,Θ,Θ Mcut
and the conclusion of this derivation is derivable in SR without multicuts by induction
hypothesis because the complexity of this derivation (i.e., the length of φ[z/x]) is strictly
smaller than c(D). Finally, finitely many applications of contraction rules enables us to
obtain the derivability of Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ in SR, as desired.
(5) Both rule(DL) and rule(DR) are modal rules and the cut formula is principal in each
of the rules: Let rule(DL) = S(R1) and rule(DR) = S(R2) where we can assume:
R1 =
Γ11 ⇒ ∆11 · · · Γ1k ⇒ ∆1k
♥1~p1, . . . ,♥a~pa ⇒ ♥a+1~q1, . . . ,♥a+b~qb, (♥~p)n ,
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R2 =
Γ21 ⇒ ∆21 · · · Γ2l ⇒ ∆2l
(♥~p)m,♠1~p′1, . . . ,♠c~p′c ⇒ ♠c+1~q′1, . . . ,♠c+d~q′d
,
because the cut formula is principal in both rules. In what follows, we assume that all
of ~pi, ~qj , ~p
′
i, ~q
′
j are distinct. So DL is of the following form:
D′L1
Σ1,Γ11σ
y1
x ⇒ ∆11σy1x ,Θ1 · · ·
D′Lk
Σ1,Γ1kσ
y1
x ⇒ ∆1kσy1x ,Θ1
Σ1, z♥1dx1 :φ1e, . . . , z♥adxa :φae⇒
z♥a+1dxa+1 :φa+1e, . . . , z♥a+bdxa+b :φa+be, (z♥dx :φe)m,Θ1
S(R1)
and DR is of the following form:
D′R1
Σ2,Γ21τ
y2
x ⇒ ∆21τy2x ,Θ2 · · ·
D′Rl
Σ2,Γ2lτ
y2
x ⇒ ∆2lτy2x ,Θ2
Σ2, (z♥dx :φe)n, z♠1dx1 :ψ1e, . . . , z♠cdxc :ψce⇒
z♠c+1dxc+1 :ψc+1e, . . . , z♠c+ddxc+d :ψc+de,Θ2
S(R2)
.
We also note that the conclusion of D is:
Σ1,Σ2,{z♥idxi :φie}16i6a, {z♠jdxj :ψje}16j6c ⇒
{z♥a+idxa+i :φa+ie}16i6b, {z♠c+jdxc+j :ψc+je}16j6d,Θ1,Θ2.
Let y be a fresh variable not occurring in this conclusion. By height-preserving substitu-
tion, we can obtain derivations D′Li [z/y1] and D′Rj [z/y2] (1 6 i 6 k and 1 6 j 6 l). Since
R absorbs multicut, we can find a rule R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γe ⇒ ∆e/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R such
that
(∗1) MCut({Γ1i ⇒ ∆1i}16i6k, {Γ2j ⇒ ∆2j}16j6l)B {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γe ⇒ ∆e} and
(∗2) ΓR ⇒ ∆R B {♥i~pi}16i6a, {♠j~p′j}16j6c ⇒ {♥a+i~qi}16i6b, {♠c+j~q′j}16j6d.
By the clause (∗1) and our derivations D′Li [z/y1], D′Rj [z/y2], we now use the induction
hypothesis (the complexity is the same but the weight becomes smaller than that of D)
and weakening rules to obtain the derivability in SR (without multicuts) of
Γiσ ⇒ ∆iσ (1 6 i 6 e)
where σ is a substitution which is the union of σy1x and τ
y2
x . It follows from the rule
S(R), the clause (∗2) and weakening rules that the conclusion of D is derivable in SR
without multicuts, as desired.
(6) One of rule(DL) and rule(DR) is an equality rule: There are three cases that we need
to consider. In the first case, rule(DR) is L =i where at least one occurrence of the cut
formulas is not principal in L =i and so the cut formula is of the form x = y. In the
second case, rule(DL) is L =i but all occurrences of the cut formula are principal. In
the third case, rule(DR) is L =i and all occurrences of the cut formula are principal.
Since our argument for the third case is almost similar to the one for the second case,
we focus on the first and the second cases in what follows.
Firstly, consider the case when rule(DR) is L =i and at least one occurrence of the
cut formulas is not principal in L =i. Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1.
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Then our derivation D is of the following form:
DL
Γ⇒ ∆, (x = y)m
D′R
x = y, φ′1[x/w], . . . , φ′n−1[x/w],Σ′[x/w]⇒ Θ′[x/w]
x = y, φ′1[y/w], . . . , φ′n−1[y/w],Σ′[y/w]⇒ Θ′[y/w]
L =1
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut
where Σ′[y/w] = Σ, Θ′[y/w] = Θ, φ′i[y/w] is x = y and so x = y, φ
′
1[y/w], . . . , φ
′
n−1[y/w]
is the same as (x = y)n. In this case we need to check what is the last rule rule(DL). If
rule(DL) is Ax (it cannot be L⊥), or a structural rule, or a logical or modal rule, we
can use the same argument in the items (1), (2), (3). If rule(DL) is an equality rule
L =i, then our argument is the same as in the second case below. The remaining case is
rule(DL) is an axiom R =. Then our derivation above D has the following form:
⇒ x = x R =
D′R
x = x, φ′1[x/w], . . . , φ′n−1[x/w],Σ′[x/w]⇒ Θ′[x/w]
x = x, φ′1[x/w], . . . , φ′n−1[x/w],Σ′[x/w]⇒ Θ′[x/w]
L =1
.
Σ⇒ Θ Mcut
Then this derivation is transformed into:
⇒ x = x R =
D′R
x = x, φ′1[x/w], . . . , φ′n−1[x/w],Σ′[x/w]⇒ Θ′[x/w]
Σ⇒ Θ Mcut
and this last application of multicut is eliminable since the complexity is the same as
that of D but the weight becomes smaller.
Secondly, let rule(DL) be L =i and assume that all occurrences of the cut formula
are principal. In this case the derivation D is of the following form:
D′L
x = y,Γ′′[x/w]⇒ ∆′′[x/w], φ′1[x/w], . . . , φ′m[x/w]
x = y,Γ′′[y/w]⇒ ∆′′[y/w], φ′1[y/w], . . . , φ′m[y/w]
L =1 DR
φn,Σ⇒ Θ
x = y,Γ′,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ Mcut
where Γ′′[y/w] = Γ′, ∆′[y/w] = ∆ and φ′i[y/w] = φ (1 6 i 6 m). Before transforming this
derivation into a multicut-free derivation, we remark that φ′i[x/w][y/x] = φ
′
i[y/w][y/x] =
φ[y/x], Γ′′[x/w][y/x] = Γ′′[y/w][y/x] = Γ′[y/x], ∆′[x/w][y/x] = ∆′[y/w][y/x] = ∆[y/x].
With the help of this remark, the derivation D is transformed into:
D′L[y/x]
y = y,Γ′[y/x]⇒ ∆[y/x], (φ[y/x])m
DR[y/x]
(φ[y/x])n,Σ[y/x]⇒ Θ[y/x]
y = y,Γ′[y/x],Σ[y/x]⇒ ∆[y/x],Θ[y/x] Mcut
x = y, y = y,Γ′[y/x],Σ[y/x]⇒ ∆[y/x],Θ[y/x] RW
x = y, x = y,Γ′,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ L =2
x = y,Γ′,Σ⇒ ∆,Θ LC
where we note that the first application of multicut is eliminable since the complexity
is the same as that of D but the weight is smaller than that of D by height-preserving
substitution [y/x].
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Theorem 6.17 (Cut Elimination). Suppose that R absorbs multicut. Then the rule Mcut
is admissible in SR. Therefore, Cut is also admissible in SR.
Proof. Suppose that a sequent is derivable in the system SR extended with MCut. Let E be
such a derivation. Then we focus on one of the topmost applications of MCut to show that
such application of MCut is eliminable, i.e., we show that the derivation whose last applied
rule is such multicut can be replaced with a multicut-free derivation of SR. This is done
using Lemma 6.16. Once we eliminate one of the topmost applications of MCut, we repeat
the same argument for the remaining topmost applications with the help of Lemma 6.16 to
get rid of all applications of MCut in the original derivation E .
In what follows, we introduce the notion of absorption of contraction and cut and show that
jointly they provide a sufficient condition of absorption of multicut.
Definition 6.18. Let S be a finite set of sequents. The set of sequents that can be derived
from premises S using (only) the contraction rules is denoted by Con(S). Similarly, the
set of all sequents that can be derived from premises in S using (only) one application of
the cut rule is denoted by Cut(S). A rule set R absorbs contraction if, for all rules R =
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γk ⇒ ∆k/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R and all Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ ∈ Con(ΓR ⇒ ∆R) there exists a
rule S = Σ1 ⇒ Θ1, · · · ,Σl ⇒ Θl/ΓS ⇒ ∆S ∈ R such that
Con({Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γk ⇒ ∆k})B {Σ1 ⇒ Θ1, . . . ,Σl ⇒ Θl}
and ΓS ⇒ ∆S B Γ′ ⇒ ∆′. A rule set R absorbs cut, if for all pairs (R1, R2) of rules in R:
Γ11 ⇒ ∆11 · · · Γ1r1 ⇒ ∆1r1
ΓR1 ⇒ ∆R1 ,♥~p
R1
Γ21 ⇒ ∆21 · · · Γ2r2 ⇒ ∆2r2
♥~p,ΓR2 ⇒ ∆R2
R2
there is a rule R = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, · · · ,Γk ⇒ ∆k/ΓR ⇒ ∆R ∈ R such that:
Cut(Γ11 ⇒ ∆11, . . . ,Γ1r1 ⇒ ∆1r1 ,Γ21 ⇒ ∆21, . . . ,Γ2r2 ⇒ ∆2r2)B {Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . ,Γk ⇒ ∆k}
and ΓR ⇒ ∆R B ΓR1 ,ΓR2 ⇒ ∆R1 ,∆R2 .
Informally, absorption of cut and contraction of a rule set allows us to replace an application
of cut or contraction to the conclusions of rules in R by a possibly different rule with possibly
weaker premises and stronger conclusion. While these definitions are purely syntactic, a
semantic characterisation has been given in [PS10] in terms of one-step cut-free completeness.
For many Λ-structures including those for the modal logic K and the logic of (monotone)
neighbourhood frames, one-step cut-free complete rule sets are known. In particular, these
rule sets satisfy absorption of cut, contraction and congruence [PS10, § 5].
Lemma 6.19. If the rule set R absorbs contraction and cut then R also absorbs multicut.
By Theorem 6.17 and Lemma 6.19, we obtain the following.
Corollary 6.20. Suppose that R absorbs contraction and cut. Then Cut is also admissible
in SR.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain completeness of the cut-free calculus assuming that R
is strongly one-step complete:
Corollary 6.21. Suppose that R is strongly one-step complete. Then |= Γ ⇒ ∆ iff
SR ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 6.17 with the help of Proposition 5.11 and 5.12 of [PS10],
the latter asserting precisely the absorption of cut and congruence.
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The situation is more complex in presence of bounded operators where completeness of the
Hilbert calculus is only guaranteed in presence of BdPL, and completeness of the associated
sequent calculus relies on Pasteki . The difficulty in a proof of cut-elimination is a cut-end
derivation where a cut is performed on x♥dy1 :φ1e . . . dyn :φne which is introduced by Pasteki
and a (one-step) rule where the same formula is principal. We leave this as an open problem:
Problem 6.22. Is there a way to modify the rules of BSR so that completeness with respect
to BHR holds and cut is admissible?
7. Conclusions and Further Work
We have introduced coalgebraic predicate logic, a natural first-order formalism that incorpo-
rates coalgebraic modalities and thus serves as an expressive language for coalgebras. As
instances, it subsumes both standard relational first-order logic and Chang’s first-order logic
of neighbourhood systems [Cha73]; other instances include a first-order logic of nonmonotone
conditionals as well as first-order logics of integer-weighted relations that include weighted
or (positive) Presburger modalities. We have provided the foundations for proof theory and
model theory of CPL.
In terms of future research, a promising avenue appears to be coalgebraic finite model
theory; in fact, the first result in this direction is the existing finite version of the coalgebraic
van Benthem-Rosen theorem [SP10a, LPSS12, SPL17]. It is worth observing that van
Benthem-Rosen is a rare instance of a model-theoretic characterization of a fragment of
first-order predicate logic that remains valid over finite models. The only other major
result of this type we are aware of is the characterization of existential-positive formulas as
exactly those preserved under homomorphisms [Ros08]. The result is relevant to constraint
satisfaction problems and to database theory, as existential-positive formulas correspond to
unions of conjunctive queries. Interestingly, the proof of Rossman’s result relies on Gaifman
graphs, which also play a central role in the proof of the coalgebraic Rosen theorem.
Embedding modal operators into a first-order syntax opens up the possibility of applying
modalities to predicates of arity greater than 1; operators of this type are found, e.g., in
Halpern’s Type-1 probabilistic first-order logic [Hal90]. We leave the ramifications of this
option to future investigation.
Possible directions in coalgebraic model theory over unrestricted models include general-
izations of standard results of classical model theory like Beth definability or interpolation
and the Keisler-Shelah characterization theorem.
It remains to be seen which results of modal model theory building upon the interplay
between modal and predicate languages can be generalized. Specific potential examples
include Sahlqvist-type results for suitably well-behaved structures and analogues of results
by Fine (does elementary generation imply canonicity, at least wherever the coalgebraic
Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem [KKP05] obtains?)5 or Hodkinson [Hod06] (is there an algorithm
generating a CML axiomatization for CPL-definable classes of coalgebras?).
Finally, a natural direction of investigation will be to study models based on coalgebras
for endofunctors on categories other than Set and corresponding variants of CPL with
non-Boolean propositional bases.
5Recently, first results in this direction have been announced by Kentaroˆ Yamamoto, UC Berkeley.
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